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ABSTRACT 
ENSURING EFFICIENCY AND GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR STATE 
ECONOMIC GROUPS IN VIETNAM 
By 
Hoang Hong Ly 
Growing along side with state-owned enterprise development, Vietnamese state economic 
groups (SEGs) have been established by restructuring state general corporations. The 
government aims to form strong SEGs to become leading players of the whole national economy, 
which have capability to compete in the global market. However, Vietnamese SEGs expose 
weaknesses both in massive unrelated diversification and unsound corporate governance 
currently. What is the right direction to address SEGs’ shortcomings and strengthen them to 
become national champions is a great concern among policy makers and observers. By reviewing 
theory of corporate governance and diversification motivations, examining the causes of SEGs’ 
current shortcomings, and studying experiences of South Korea and China, this thesis suggests 
recommendations to ensure efficiency and good corporate governance for SEGs in Vietnam.  
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Introduction 
Vietnam has already joined several regional and international economic organizations, of which 
the WTO is the most important in accelerating global economic integration. Once Vietnam 
integrates deeply into the world economy, Vietnamese enterprises will have to struggle not only 
in the global market but also at home.  
On November 12, 2005, the Vietnamese government approved the establishment of the 
first state economic group - the Vietnam Coal and Minerals Group (VOVNews, 2006). Since 
then eleven others have made their debut. Vietnam aims to establish powerful state economic 
groups (SEGs) that play a key role in the national economy, thereby allowing the government to 
regulate market flexibility and creating a lever for the whole economy amidst global competition 
(VOVNews, 2006). However, the establishment of economic groups is new and therefore 
management of these groups becomes a challenge for the government. This requires policy-
makers to grasp all issues of economic groups to secure their foothold in the competitive global 
market and enhance development of national economy.  
Among the current issues surrounding Vietnamese SEGs, diversification is a 
controversial concern. Besides their main business fields, these economic groups are investing in 
other fields, especially in unrelated business areas (VietNamNetBridge, 2008). Some observers 
claim that they must focus on the main business field, while others suggest that they should 
diversify to enhance their sustainability.  
2 
 
Therefore, the questions that this study seeks to answer are should SEGs pursue 
diversification, into what business areas they might enter, and how much they should diversify. 
In this connection, the advantages and risks of unrelated diversification will be investigated. 
Another question is how to ensure efficient corporate governance of SEGs to improve their 
performance. In order to answer this, problems in SEGs’ corporate governance will be examined. 
A good way to realize the objective of establishing powerful economic groups in 
Vietnam is by reviewing experiences of other countries. China is well-known with its state 
business groups. Besides, Korea is also famous with its public corporations and family-
controlled Chaebols which were heavily benefited by the government as its development 
partners. Therefore, Korea and China are selected countries which can provide many useful 
lessons in governance and management of business groups.  
This study’s purpose is to conduct a comprehensive analysis on the current situation of 
Vietnamese SEGs and make recommendations based on experiences from China and Korea. In 
more detail, the study will look at the current trends towards diversification and the corporate 
governance practices of the groups. From the uncovered problems, this study will suggest 
recommendations to ensure efficiency and good corporate governance for SEGs. In addition, 
lessons from China and Korea will be extensively utilized, while taking into account the 
differences between Vietnamese, Korean and Chinese groups in terms of their ownership 
structure and growth path. 
Since the establishment of SEGs is a recent phenomenon, the number of researches on 
their operation and corporate governance, especially research conducted in English, has not been 
plentiful. This study will thus be a worthy source to add more information to the literature to 
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support both Vietnamese and international information seekers. The study also provides a 
reference for the Vietnamese government, decision makers, SEGs, and other concerned parties to 
have a better understanding of the related situations.  
This study is limited to business diversification and corporate governance issues of SEGs, 
which is the field of interest of the researcher, to make suggestions. However, the real 
operational business does not consist of only the diversification strategy and therefore broader 
consideration in the linkage with other issues might be needed to make the best decision for 
those groups.  
The objective of this study is to answer two main concerns: (1) should SEGs diversify 
and if yes, into what business areas they might enter, and how much should they enter; and (2) 
how to ensure efficient corporate governance in SEGs. In order to do so, some respects should be 
clarified: How is the current situation? What are the problems in their diversification and 
corporate governance? What are the relevant solutions? The structure of this study is organized 
to deal with those respects in chapter 2, 3, and 4.   
In the next sections, the study will provide some general information, as well as a 
summary of prior related research and describe the methods by which the study is conducted. 
Chapter 1, then, will show the overview of Vietnamese SEGs. Current situations in 
diversification and governance of the groups will be discussed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 will focus 
on existing issues in their diversification and corporate governance. Following this, based on the 
found issues, chapter 4 will make suggestions to ensure efficiency and good corporate 
governance for SEGs while taking in to account Korea’s and China’s experiences. Finally, the 
study will be closed by the conclusion chapter with the summary of all study.  
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Literature review 
There are various definitions of business groups or economic groups. A business (economic) 
group is “a group of companies that does business in different markets under a common 
administrative or financial control” (Leff, 1978), “a cluster of legally distinct firms with a 
managerial relationship” (Jamesrmaclean, 2005) or “a set of firms, which, though legally 
independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and are 
accustomed to taking coordinated action” (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). 
In Korea, according to the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of Korea Fair Trade 
Commission (1990): 
The term “Business Group” pertains to a group of companies whose businesses 
are substantially controlled by the same person according to the following 
pursuant to the standards prescribed by the Presidential Decree: 
A. The “same person” is a company or a group composed of such person and one 
or more companies he/she controls. 
B. The “same person” is not a company or a group composed of two or more 
companies he/she controls.  
In China, “according to the National Statistics Bureau of China (NSBC), a business group 
consists of legally independent entities that are partly or wholly owned by a parent firm and 
registered as affiliated firms of that parent firm” (Ma & Lu, 2005). 
In Vietnam, the Law on Enterprise (2005) mentions the concept of business group model 
as a group of companies which has “the long term relationship in terms of economic interests, 
technology, market and other business services. Group of companies comprises the following 
forms: a)Parent company and subsidiaries; b)Economic corporation; c)Other forms”. The Decree 
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139/2007/NĐ-CP1 detailed some provisions of the Law on Enterprise 2005 and regulated in the 
article 26:  
An economic group consists of companies with the independent legal person status, 
which are combined or associated through investment, capital contribution, merger, 
acquisition, re-organization or other forms of association; bound together on a long-term 
basis in terms of economic interests, technology, market and other business services, thus 
formulating a business complex with enterprises organized at two or more levels, 
operating in the form of parent company-subsidiary company. 
Business groups are ubiquitous not only in emerging countries but also in developed ones. 
BGs are formed mostly by equity ties both of vertical (pyramid control) or horizontal types 
(cross-shareholding). Business groups operate in various industries from banking and finance to 
manufacturing and energy. Studying on business groups is important in all countries, especially 
in developing ones because “there is hardly any economic investigation that can (or should) be 
carried out without reference to business groups and their impact” (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005).  
Many companies start their business with a single product or a single business area to 
keep resources concentrated on developing the main line. When growing larger and stronger, 
they might find additional opportunities to add revenue, products, markets and entering in new 
business areas both related and unrelated to the main beginning line. That is an example of 
diversification strategy. Diversification “refers to the expansion of an existing firm into another 
product line or market” (OECD, 1993) or is understood as “a risk-reduction strategy that 
involves adding product, services, location, customers and markets to companies' portfolio” 
(Entrepreneur, 2009). Almost all business groups have diversification strategy and since they 
diversify, they can be called diversified business groups which “typically consist of legally 
                                                 
1 Decree 139/2007/NĐ-CP dated 05/9/2007, on guiding the implementation of a number of articles of the Enterprise 
Law 
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independent firms, operating in multiple markets, which are bound together by persistent formal 
and informal ties” (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005).  
 There are two types of diversification, related and unrelated (OECD, 1993). “Related 
diversification occurs when the firm expands into similar product lines” while “unrelated 
diversification takes place when the products are very different from each other” (OECD, 1993).   
In Vietnam, although SEGs have been newly established from 2005, they have already 
started to diversify. This has occurred not only in related areas but also in unrelated ones with a 
lot of investment capital (Cong Thang, 2009). The recent operation of SEGs triggers many 
controversies among observers. SEGs’ current operation is characterized by an excessive 
investment, jumping into risky and sensitive areas, and lack of concentration on their forte 
business (Cong Thang, 2009). However, those arguments have stopped at the level of debate on 
meetings, conferences, or interviews, and have just been published in some articles and a few 
reports. There are rarely published researches specifying deeply on diversification of SEGs.       
Besides investigating diversification issues of Vietnamese SEGs, there is another aspect 
that should be considered, namely corporate governance. European Central Bank defined 
corporate governance as “Procedures and processes according to which an organization is 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities among the different participants in the organization – such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules and procedures for 
decision-making” (2004). Corporate governance can be seen as the basis for efficiency of a 
company’s activities. It has a significant influence on the operation and performance of 
companies in which diversification is a part. “Good corporate governance contributes to 
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sustainable economic development by enhancing the performance of companies and increasing 
their access to outside capital” (IFC, 2009).  
There are a lot of studies on diversification and corporate governance of business groups 
worldwide. In Korea, the number of studies on corporate governance and diversification of their 
business groups - Chaebols which are famous for large diversification is plentiful. Bae, Kwon, 
and Lee (2008) examined the valuation effect of corporate diversification of Korean business 
groups before and after the 1997 Korean financial crisis; Choi and Cowing (2002) studied the 
relationships involving corporate diversification, concentration and economic performance for 
the 25 largest Korean Chaebols over the period 1985–1995. Corporate governance of Chaebols is 
also received numerous attention of scholars, from Chaebols’ structure and feature of corporate 
governance (Isao, 2004), control structure and shareholdingship (Hwang and Seo, 2000) to 
executive compensation and performance (Kato, Kim & Lee, 2007). 
Chinese business groups have been also studied in many aspects of corporate governance 
and diversification such as the influence of affiliation and market institutions on business groups’ 
performance (Carney, Shapiro & Tang, 2008), the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance and the influence of corporate status on that relation (Yue, Lan & Jiang, 2008), 
examination of Chinese business groups’ performance of 470 publicly listed firms from 1999 to 
2004 (Carney, Shapiro & Tang, 2008), investigating the establishment and growth process, 
diversification strategy, organizational structure of Chinese business groups (Ma & Lu, 2005). 
In Vietnam, corporate governance of SEGs and their diversification has not been paid 
enough attention. Few studies related to this area have been published. Researchers only can get 
vague information on SEGs in minority of online newspapers or reports. Therefore, this study 
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aims to contribute to the treasury of general knowledge, and assist researchers in finding 
information of economic groups in Vietnam especially in terms of their diversification and 
corporate governance.  
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Methodology 
This chapter demonstrates methods utilized to answer the research questions. It presents the type 
of research and research design as well as clarifies the chosen sample of economic groups in 
Vietnam. Collecting and analyzing data and information are presented, followed by the 
discussion of validity and reliability of research. 
Type of research 
The research is mainly qualitative, aiming to explore the current situation and issues, then 
suggesting recommendations for improvement. Additionally, the research also utilizes some 
quantitative data to provide solid numbers relating to the operation of economic groups.  
Research design 
This study is designed in the form of both descriptive and exploratory research. This research 
design allows the researcher to explore the practices of SEGs’ diversification and corporate 
governance, and what SEGs should do. The study thus generates basic knowledge, clarifies 
relevant issues, and examines associate responsibilities and relationships among stakeholders. 
Research methods 
The utilized research methods include a thorough literature search, policy analysis and 
comparative analysis. By the literature search method, the researcher looked at related studies, 
reports, published statistics, articles, and journals to understand the actual situation of SEGs as 
well as the experience of economic groups in Korea and China. Furthermore, policy and 
comparative analysis is also applied by investigating governmental documents and policies on 
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economic groups of Vietnam, Korea, and China, then comparing the circumstance of each 
country to synthesize solutions for the diversification and corporate governance of SEGs. 
Focus sample 
There are both private and state economic groups in Vietnam. However, the thesis focuses on 
state owned economic groups. Until now, Vietnam has established twelve state economic groups, 
eleven of which are fully state-owned and one is partly owned by the state, and the researcher 
has chosen all of them to conduct the thesis. 
Data collection and analysis 
This study gathered information and data by finding the official documents of the governments 
and analyzing relevant studies, reports, books, articles, and other materials from lectures and 
conferences. Current policy information and operational data are sourced from laws, 
governmental decrees and regulations, publications of Ministry of Planning and Investment, 
Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), Academy of Finance, National Center for 
Socio-Economic Information and Forecast (NCEIF), and State Capital Investment Corporation 
(SCIC), etc. Information is also collected from Internet websites (e.g. Vietnamnetbridge, 
VOVNew) to find out the objective ideals of specialists and citizens apart from the government’s 
view. Materials from Korea and China such as State-owned Asset Supervision (SASAC), 
Administration Commission of China, The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), Korea 
Economic Research Institute (KERI), etc are used to review experiences of those countries. 
Furthermore, the study also uses information from reputable international journals (e.g. 
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, SERIQuaterly…) to investigate academic literature.  
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From the selected literature, the thesis examined purpose of establishment, functions, 
designated missions, current diversification and corporate governance to analyze current 
situation of SEGs. Also, numerable information of experience from Chinese and Korean business 
groups is collected to get appropriate solutions for Vietnam. 
Validity and reliability 
This research uses official government documents to express situation in Vietnam. The thesis 
also explores studies done by think-tank organizations in Vietnam, China, and Korea such as 
NCEIF, CIEM, FKI, KERI, SASAC and academic institutions such as the Vietnam Academy of 
Finance and KDI School to evaluate the current situation of and get lessons for SEGs. This 
improves the credibility for the sources of research and provides the benchmark for observation 
and analysis. 
Based on the mentioned sample, methods, and process of collecting and analyzing information, 
this thesis will fulfill the purpose of conducting a comprehensive analysis on SEGs and making 
recommendations based on experiences of Korea and China to ensure efficient diversification 
and good corporate governance for Vietnamese SEGs.  
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Chapter 1: Overview of state economic groups in Vietnam 
1.1. Establishment of Vietnamese state economic groups (SEGs) 
The SEGs’ formation has gone alongside with the formation and development of state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam. Before 1990, state cooperatives and SOEs occupied the life-line 
and controlled all operation of the Vietnam’s economy. However, operating in the planned 
economic mechanism, these state enterprises became governmental administrative organizations. 
The government began to reorganize SOEs with some pilot projects in 1990-1991. 
Through the SOE reform process, Prime Minister promulgated Decisions 91/TTg 2  in 
1994 to establish state general corporations from reorganizing existed SOEs, namely general 
corporations 913. Those state general corporations were formed from selected large scale SOEs 
which “have important role in the national economy, are able to ensure necessary requirement 
for domestic market, and have prospect to develop and penetrate foreign markets” (Decision 91, 
1994). They operated in certain strategically important sectors such as electricity, gasoline, coal 
and mineral, post and telecommunication, textile, shipbuilding, steel, air line, cement, chemical, 
paper, tobacco, food. In 2004, there were eighteen general corporations 91 with 487 members 
(Academy of Finance, 2009). These general corporations hold and control many key areas of the 
economy. Therefore, they play an important role in the country’s economic growth and were 
identified as an important tool to monitor the whole economy and society.  
                                                 
2 Decision 91/TTg dated 7 March 1994 on pilot establishment of economic groups. However, because economic 
groups were a new model in Vietnam at that time so those established enterprises under Decision 91 were not yet 
called economic groups, but general corporations 91. Until 2005, those general corporations 91 started to be 
reorganized to become economic groups. 
3 GCs 91 were established by Prime Minister’s office. GCs 91 need at least 7 company members. Moreover, GCs 91 
need to have book equity of at least VND 1 trillion and 7 to 9 members in the board. 
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Although the idea of establishing economic groups had been conceived in the Decision 
91, only at the 3rd plenum of Communist Party Central Committee in August 2001, economic 
group establishment was discussed in detail. The resolution of the plenum emphasized on 
restructuring SOEs and forming economic groups (Vietnam embassy, 2001). To deploy the 
resolution, the government has been establishing SEGs by reforming general corporations 91. 
The first SEG - the Vietnam Coal and Minerals Group made its debut in Hanoi on November 12, 
2005.   
Until January 2010, there are 12 economic groups established by the Prime Minister 
namely; VNPT, Vinacomin, Petro VN, EVN, Vinashin, Vinatex, VRG, BaoViet, Viettel, 
Vinachem, HUD Holdings, and Songda.  Table 1 shows the list of SEGs in Vietnam. The SEGs 
are organized according to the “parent and subsidiary” model, where the parent companies are 
fully state-owned. Only Baoviet group has a special mother company which is established as a 
joint-stock company in which the state holds a majority of shares. Those SEGs are under the 
supervision of Prime Minister except for Baoviet group which is under Ministry of Finance and 
Viettel group which is under Ministry of Defence.4  
Table 1: State economic groups in Vietnam 
Group Name Mother Company (or Holding Company) 
Ownership 
Structure of Mother 
Company 
Supervising 
Government 
Agency 
Establishment 
date
Electricity of Vietnam 
Group (EVN) 
Electricity of Vietnam  
www.evn.com.vn  
100% state capital Prime Minister’s 
Office 
17 Dec, 2006 
Vietnam National Oil 
and Gas Group (Petro 
VN) 
Petro Vietnam 
www.pvn.vn  
100% state capital Prime Minister’s 
Office 
29 Aug 2006 
Vietnam Coal and 
Mineral Industries Group 
(Vinacomin) 
Vietnam National Coal and 
Mineral Industries 
www.vinacomin.vn  
100% state capital Prime Minister’s 
Office 
12 Nov 2005 
Vietnam Post and 
Telecommunications 
Vietnam Post and 
Telecommunication Corp.  
100% state capital Prime Minister’s 
Office 
26 March 2006
                                                 
4 It is because Viettel group is restructured from the army telecommunication corporation – Viettel Corporation 
which is under Ministry of Defence. 
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Group (VNPT) www.vnpt.com.vn  
Vietnam Shipbuilding 
Industrial Group 
(Vinashin) 
Vietnam Shipbuilding 
Industry Corp.  
www.vinashinship.com.vn  
100% state capital Prime Minister’s 
Office 
23 May 2009 
Vietnam Textile and 
Garment Group 
(Vinatex) 
Vietnam National Textile and 
Garment Corp. (Vinatex) 
www.vinatex.com.vn  
100% state capital Prime Minister’s 
Office 
6 Dec 2005 
Vietnam Rubber Group 
(VRG) 
Vietnam Rubber Corp. 
www.vnrubbergroup.eu  
100% state capital Prime Minister’s 
Office 
30 Oct 2006 
Bao Viet Group Bao Viet Holdings 
www.baoviet.com.vn  
77.54% (government), 10% 
(foreign), domestic (3.56%), 
employees (0.81%), 
insurance agencies (0.12%), 
others (7.97%) 
Ministry of Finance 15 Oct 2007 
Viettel group Viettel 
http://www.viettel.com.vn/ 
100% state capital Ministry of Defence 12 Jan 2010 
Vietnam National 
Chemical group 
(Vinachem) 
Vietnam chemical Corp. 
http://www.vinachem.com.vn/
100% state capital Prime Minister’s 
Office 
23 Dec 2009 
Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD 
Group) 
HUD Corp. 
http://www.hud.com.vn/ 
100% state capital Prime Minister’s 
Office 
12 Jan 2010 
Songda Group Songda Corp. 
http://www.songda.com.vn 
 
100% state capital Prime Minister’s 
Office 
12 Jan 2010 
Source: Vietnamese government portal and websites of economic groups 
 
The government is still reforming SOEs according to the parent-subsidiary model and 
plans to establish more SEGs. According to CIEM (2009), some corporations in shipping 
(Vinalines), railways, tobacco (Vinataba), and cement areas have been assigned to be 
restructured into economic groups. Some other large-scale enterprises in banking sector such as 
Bank for Foreign Trade (Vietcombank), Bank for Investment and Development (BIDV), Bank 
for Industry and Trade (VietinBank), and Mekong Housing Bank (MHB), are expected to be 
reorganized and shifted to economic groups through a process of full equitization which is 
similar to the case of Baoviet Insurance Group.  
The SEG formation in the economic development process of Vietnam shows their unique 
characteristic. The establishment of all existing economic groups has resulted from 
administrative management decisions of the government basing on the SOE reform, not from the 
initiatives and capabilities of companies by themselves. It also means that Vietnamese SEGs are 
15 
 
different from business groups in other countries. They are not set up by the process of 
agglomeration, capital concentration, or merger and acquisition. 
1.2. Purpose of the establishment and functions of Vietnamese SEGs 
The establishment of SEGs is one of the most important government policies in Vietnam. The 
purpose of establishing SEGs is to promote capital agglomeration and economies of scale, push 
up SOE reform, improve the efficiency of large scale SOEs in strategically important sectors, 
strengthen their ability to penetrate the global market, and enhance efficiency of the whole 
economy. 
The first government document on establishment of economic groups, the Decision 91 in 
1994, stated the purpose of forming SEGs is “to promote agglomeration and concentration, 
enhance competitive capability, gradually abolish administrative management, strengthen state 
management over all enterprises, and improve the economy’s efficiency”. The decree 
101/2009/ND-CP on piloting the establishment, organization, operation and management of 
SEGs in 2009, then, reinforce the purpose of SEG establishment: to form economic groups “in 
key sectors or industries which need to be developed, improve groups’ competitive capability 
and ability to penetrate global market”.  
With the goal of forming industrial leaders for the whole economy, SEGs have following 
functions (Decree 101/2009/ND-CP): 
- To ensure the great economic balances of the economy, apply high technologies, and 
create development motivations for other fields and the whole economy.  
- To promote linkage within the value chain and develop other economic sectors. 
- To strengthen effective management and supervision of state capital and assets 
invested in groups’ members. 
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1.3. Current business environment of SEGs with global competition 
After the “Doi Moi” policy in 1986, Vietnam has observed the dramatic change in both the 
economy and society. Now, Vietnam is in the progress of global economic integration. “Vietnam 
signed an economic and trade cooperation agreement with the EU in 1992, joined ASEAN in 
1995, AFTA in 1996 and APEC in 1998. Vietnam also signed the Bilateral Trade Agreement 
with the United States in 2000” (MOFA, 2007). The biggest economic event for Vietnamese was 
on 11 January 2007 when Vietnam joined the WTO and took the organization’s membership to 
150 (WTO, 2007).  
 According to Minister of Trade - Truong Dinh Tuyen, “by 2015, most commodities 
imported to Vietnam will have duties ranging from 0 to 5%” (VOVNews, 2006). Once Vietnam 
integrates deeply into the world, all economic entities, particularly the SEGs, which serve as the 
leading force of Vietnam’s economy, will have to struggle not only in the global market but also 
at home. 
In order to secure firms’ foothold, SEGs should increase their competitive capacity. “The 
fact is that while Vietnamese trademarks have not established a firm foothold overseas, the 
prestigious trademarks of big international groups are dominating the country” (VOVNews, 
2006). As a result, domestic SEGs are very vulnerable compared to other global economic 
groups. Therefore, SEGs should make every effort for their survival and growth in the intensified 
competition of the integration process. “They should also consider the interests of millions of 
Vietnamese people who desire to generate and enjoy the fruits of socio-economic development” 
(Chi Lan, 2006, cited in VOVNews). By doing so, the dream of Vietnam to establish powerful 
economic groups can be achieved.   
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Chapter 2: Current diversification and governance of state economic groups 
in Vietnam. 
2.1. Diversification pattern of State economic groups (SEGs) 
As of January 2010, Vietnam has twelve SEGs which are assigned to corresponding main 
businesses including post-telecommunication-information technology (VNPT and Viettel 5), ship 
building and repairing (Vinashin), electricity production-distribution-trading (EVN), gasoline 
exploration-exploitation-processing-distribution (PetroVN), coal and mineral exploration-
exploitation-processing-distribution (Vinacomin), textile and garment (Vinatex), rubber 
growing-exploitation-processing (VRG), insurance business (Baoviet), construction and 
construction material manufacturing (Songda), basic-phamarceutical-consumption chemical 
manufacturing (Vinachem), and house and real estate (HUD).   
Besides the main business, most SEGs diversify to other unrelated business fields such as 
securities, insurance, banking, real estate, telecommunication, cement, transportation, tourism, 
and labor export. In this expansion pattern, diversification is pursued in two ways. The first one 
is that the mother company makes a direct investment or capital contribution to establish new 
companies in new business fields. The second one is when the subsidiaries invest or contribute 
capital to other companies in unrelated business (MPI Vietnamese delegation, 2009).   
It seems that all SEGs aggressively jump into other business fields, especially 
“fashionable areas” such as banking, securities, and real estate. This was illustrated in 
VietNamNetBridge, 2008: “The Prime Minister on October 30, 2006 signed the decision 
                                                 
5 Viettel group only operates in telecommunication and information technology fields.  
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approving the project on establishing the Vietnam Rubber Group (VRG). Just one month later, 
November 14, 2006, VRG decided to set up the VRG’s Securities Company, of which VRG’s 
Finance Company contributed 51% of the chartered capital (VND20.4bil)”. However, “the 
appearance of a securities company under a rubber group did not surprise anyone, as the market 
at that time also saw the establishment of the securities company under PetroVietnam…, ship 
building group… The EVN group is also one of the groups which has been pioneering in making 
investments in banking and securities” (VietNamNetBridge, 2008). In addition, the real estate 
field is not under-explored. Real estate developers and citizens as a whole have been familiar 
with such names as Vinatex Land (24 Dec 2007), Vinacomin Land (13 Nov 2007), or Petro Land 
(29 Oct 2007) which were formed correspondingly by Vinatex, Vinacomin, and Petro VN. More 
than that, there are also a number of finance companies under SEGs. Some of them were SOEs 
established by the government then being reorganized to be subsidiaries of SEGs and some of 
them have been newly formed by SEGs. Such names as Petro VN Finance, EVN Finance, VN 
Shipbuilding Finance, Rubber Finance, Mineral & Coal Finance, Post & telecommunication 
Finance are well-known in the finance sector. Through the time, the number of SEGs’ 
subsidiaries in such finance, securities, banking areas has become abundant. Appendix 1 lists 
some SEG’s unrelated subsidiaries which operate in finance, banking, and real estate areas. 
2.2. Corporate governance of Vietnamese SEGs 
Vietnamese SEGs’ formation is based on the restructuring of state general corporations “91” and 
the development of a group of state-owned companies toward the “mother-subsidiary” model in 
which one hundred percent of the mother company’s charter capital or the majority of its shares 
is owned by the government. Until the end of 2009, the government issued Decree 
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153/2004/ND-CP6, Decree 111/2007/ND-CP7, and Decree 101/2009/ND-CP8 to regulate the 
restructuring, establishment, organization and management of SEGs.  
2.2.1. Organizational and ownership structure of SEGs 
The Vietnamese government orients the establishment of SEGs basing on the restructuring of 
general corporations 91 toward “holding company structure” which is called “mother-subsidiary 
model” in Vietnam. Usually, circular shareholding (cross shareholding) structure and holding 
company structure are the two forms of business groups’ organizational and ownership structure. 
Compared to the circular shareholding structure, the later can bring some benefits for business 
groups to enhance their management function:  
- Holding company structure increases transparency for the whole group’s organizational 
and ownership structure. Thus, it can increase the speed of the group’s management 
decision making, make the holding company easier to oversee the entire group, allow 
advantages in financial planning, and help governmental agencies and investors easier to 
supervise and access groups’ information.  
- Holding company structure provides a more appropriate distribution of responsibilities 
across management levels between the holding company and subsidiaries. It centralizes 
specific management functions within the holding company (developing the group’s 
strategies, allocating capital among groups’ subsidiaries, coordinating subsidiaries…), 
which enables the group to accommodate subsidiaries more efficiently under one roof. At 
                                                 
6 Decree 153/2004/ND-CP dated 9th August 2004 on organization, management of State General Corporations and 
transformation of SGCs and independent state companies according to the model of “parent and subsidiary 
company”. 
7 Decree 111/2007/ND-CP dated 26th June 2007 on the organization and management of state corporations and the 
transformation of state corporations, independent state companies and parent companies being state companies into 
ones operating after the parent-subsidiary company model under the Enterprise Law.  
8 Decree 101/2009/ND-CP dated 5th November 2009 on piloting the establishment, organization, operation and 
management of state economic groups. 
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the same time, holding company structure still ensures operation flexibility for each 
subsidiary as it allows decentralized management in which “each subsidiary retains its 
own management team, and … become responsible to the parent company on a profit and 
loss basis” (referenceforbusiness, 2010). 
According to the Article 4 of Decree 101/2009/ND-CP, the organizational and ownership 
structure of SEGs is constructed under “mother-subsidiary” model which comprises:  
a) Parent companies (referred to as grade-I enterprises) which are enterprises whose 
charter capital is wholly owned or controlling right is held by the State under the 
Prime Minister's decision; 
b) Affiliate companies of grade-I enterprises (referred to as grade-II enterprises) which 
are enterprises whose controlling right is held by grade-I enterprises and organized as 
joint-stock companies, one-member or two-plus-member limited liability companies, 
corporations after the parent-affiliate company model, joint-venture companies, or 
overseas subsidiaries; 
c) Affiliate companies of grade-II enterprises and lower-grade enterprises. 
d) Associated enterprises of the group, including enterprises in which capital 
contribution portions of parent companies and affiliate companies are below the 
controlling level; enterprises without contributed capital of parent companies and 
affiliate companies which voluntarily join the association, whether under association 
contracts or not.  
Based on the regulation, Vietnamese SEGs’ structure consists of mother company (grade I), 
subsidiaries (grade II, III…) whose majority or minority of capital is held by the mother 
company or lower grade subsidiaries, and associated companies which voluntarily join the group 
without capital contribution of mother company and subsidiaries.  
Managerial organization structure of the mother company is regulated in the Article 20 of 
Decree 101/2009/ND-CP: “A parent company has its Board of Directors, director general, 
Control Board and assistant apparatus”. 
The chart below is an example of the organizational and ownership structure of VNPT. 
Standing in the highest position is the mother (parent) company which is owned 100% by the 
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government. Subsidiaries are in various forms such as state-owned, joint-stock, joint venture, and 
limited liability companies which are owned 100%, more than 50%, or less than 50% by VNPT.  
Figure 1: The organizational and ownership structure of VNPT 
Source: VNPT website 2009, http://www.vnpt.com.vn/en-US/About-VNPT/Organization-Structure/vnpt.html 
In the past, the relation between the government, general corporations (GCs), and 
subsidiaries was heavily based on administrative, subsidized, and “asking-giving” mechanisms. 
The government allotted capital to GCs, then GCs allotted to subsidiaries with little concern on 
effectiveness. In addition, the GCs were overwhelmed by the job of managing, monitoring, and 
supervising all subsidiaries, which led to inefficient operation.  
However, with the new structure of “mother-subsidiary” model, the government invests in 
the mother company and the mother company invests in subsidiaries and other enterprises 
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(NCSEIF, 2007). Subsidiaries have the right to invest in other member companies except the 
holding company (Decree 101/2009/ND-CP). The mother company also shifts its monitoring 
mechanism on subsidiaries from administrative monitoring to monitoring of business operation 
through its investment. Such kinds of transaction as selling, buying, lending, borrowing, and 
renting between the mother company and subsidiaries must be based on contracts. 
2.2.2. Corporate Governance of SEGs 
Government’s supervision on SEGs 
According to the Decree 132/2005/ND-CP 9 on performing rights and duties of state owner in 
SOEs, the Decree 86/2006/ND-CP 10  for amendment, and the Decree 101/2009/ND-CP, the 
Prime Minister is responsible for ten SEGs including EVN, PetroVN, Vinacomin, VNPT, 
Vinashin, Vinatex, VRG, Vinachem, HUD, and Songda; the Ministry of Finance is responsible 
for Baoviet Group, and the Ministry of Defense is responsible for Viettel group.   
The Decree 132, Decree 86 and especially the Decree 101/2009/ND-CP clarify 
management and supervision of SEGs. Assignment of tasks and decentralization of powers to 
exercise the state owner's rights towards parent companies of SEGs is regulated in the Article 40 
of Decree 101:  
1. The Prime Minister (PM) shall:  
- Decide on establishment of parent companies; decide on reorganization, dissolution 
or ownership transformation of parent companies at the request of line ministries and 
based on opinions of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI);  
                                                 
9 Decree 132/2005/ND-CP dated 20th October 2005 on exercise of rights and performance of obligations of the state-
owner to State Companies. 
10 Decree 86/2006/ND-CP dated 21st August 2006 on Amending and supplementing a number of articles of the 
Government's Decree no. 132/2005/ND-CP of October 20, 2005, on exercise of rights and performance of 
obligations of the state owner to state companies 
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- Approve objectives, strategies, long-term plans and business lines of parent 
companies at the request of their BODs and based on opinions of line ministries, the 
MOF and the MPI; 
- Approve charters of parent companies and amendments and supplements thereto at 
the request of their BODs and based on opinions of line ministries, MOF and MPI;  
- Decide on capital investment for the formation of charter capital of parent companies 
and adjustment of charter capital in the course of their operation at the request of their 
BODs and based on opinions of line ministries, the MOF and the MPI; 
- Decide on investment projects of parent companies and outward investment projects 
which fall under the Prime Minister's deciding competence;  
- Decide on appointment, re-appointment, dismissal, removal from office, 
commendation and disciplining of chairpersons and members of BODs of parent 
companies at the request of line ministries and according to verification by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs;  
- Permit the BODs to decide on appointment, re-appointment or dismissal of CEO or 
enter into labor contracts with, commend or discipline CEO at the request of the 
BODs and upon verification by line ministries 
2.  Line ministries shall:  
- Propose to the PM for decision the establishment, reorganization, dissolution or 
ownership transformation of parent companies; the appointment, re-appointment, 
dismissal, removal from office, commendation and disciplining of chairpersons of the 
BODs of parent companies; 
- Give their opinions on charters of parent companies or amendments and supplements 
thereto; appointment, re-appointment, dismissal, commendation or disciplining of. 
and entry into labor contracts with CEO, before the PM approves them: or on 
objectives, strategies, long-term plans, business lines, charter capital and adjusted 
charter capital of parent companies before the PM decides on them; 
- Direct the implementation and realization of objectives, strategies and long-term 
plans of parent companies and the inspection thereof;  
- Take responsibility for the observance of processes, procedures, standards, qualities 
and capacity of members of the BODs and CEO of parent companies before 
proposing them to the PM for appointment. 
3. The Ministry of Finance shall:  
- Give its opinions, before the PM considers and decides, on the establishment, 
reorganization, dissolution and ownership transformation of parent companies: 
approval of charters of parent companies and amendments and supplements thereto; 
capital investment for the formation of charter capital and adjustment of charter 
capital in the course of operation of parent companies; 
- Fully invest in charter capital of parent companies under the PM's decisions; 
-   Approve financial management regulations of parent companies at the request of the 
BODs of parent companies, unless otherwise prescribed by the Government. 
5. The Ministry of Planning and Investment shall: give its opinions before the PM 
considers and decides, on the establishment, reorganization, dissolution and 
ownership transformation of parent companies; objectives, strategies, long-term plans 
and business lines of parent companies; approval of the charter capital of parent 
companies; approval of amendments and supplements to the charter capital of parent 
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companies; capital investment for the formation of charter capital and adjustment of 
charter capital in the course of operation of parent companies. 
6. The Ministry of Home Affairs shall:  
- Assess the observance of processes, procedures, standards and conditions for 
appointment, re-appointment, dismissal, commendation and disciplining of 
chairpersons and members of BODs as proposed by line ministries to the PM. 
- Guide the order and procedures for appointment, re-appointment, dismissal, removal 
from office, commendation and disciplining of chairpersons and members of BODs, 
CEO, deputy directors general or deputy directors, chief accountants and other key 
managerial posts of parent companies. 
7. The BODs of parent companies may be authorized by the PM to exercise the rights and 
perform the obligations of the state owner towards parent companies and state-invested 
capital in state economic groups… 
The Article 42 of Decree 101 regulates on assignment of tasks to perform supervision on SEGs:  
a/ The Ministry of Finance shall supervise and assess financial operations, business 
results and effectiveness of the parent company and the entire group; supervision of 
issuance of stocks, increase in the charter capital of the parent company and member 
enterprises: expenses for salary payment; supervision of borrowing of loans for 
investment in financial, banking, real estate and securities areas; supervise the movement 
of capital, investment and resources within the group and from the group to the outside or 
vice versa: and monitor consolidated financial statements of the groups;  
b/ The Ministry of Labor War Invalids and Social Affairs shall supervise SEGs in 
implementing regulations on the average salary increase rate which is lower than the 
labor productivity increase rate;  
c/ Line ministries shall supervise investment portfolios, main and related business lines: 
assess the structure of main and related business lines; oversee leading management 
personnel of parent companies; assess the capability to satisfy demands for leading 
management personnel for main and related business lines;  
d/ The Ministry of Planning and Investment shall monitor and supervise the 
implementation of schemes on establishment of SEGs; supervise parent companies in 
establishing new enterprises, contributing capital to other enterprises in risky sectors, 
industries, geographical areas and projects; supervise and assess the performance of the 
state owner's function towards parent companies in SEGs; assess results of 
implementation of these schemes; analyze advantages and risks of development of SEGs: 
supervise and assess the implementation of development strategies of SEGs;  
e/ Other supervision jobs not specified at Points a. b, c and d of this Clause shall be 
performed by the Government or the Prime Minister or agencies and organizations 
authorized by the Government or the Prime Minister. 
 Board of Directors (BODs) in the mother company 
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According to the Article 21 of Decree 101/2009/ND-CP, the BODs is “a body directly 
representing the state owner in a parent company, exercising the rights and performing the 
obligations of the owner towards enterprises whose charter capital is wholly invested by the 
parent company and to the parent company's capital contributions to other enterprises”. The 
BODs is composed of between 5 and 9 members appointed, reappointed, dismissed or replaced, 
commended, rewarded or disciplined by the Prime Minister at the request of line ministers. The 
term of office of a member of BODs is 5 years. Members of BODs may be reappointed. The 
Prime Minister shall decide on the membership and number of full-time or part-time members of 
the BODs of each SEG. 
According to Dr. Tran Tien Cuong – CIEM (2009) there are two types of members of 
BODs: people from the group and governmental officers. In PetroVN, there are two 
representatives from Ministry of Finance (Mr.Tran Xuan Ha – Vice minister) and Ministry of 
Industry and Trade (Mr. Bui Xuan Khu – Vice minister) being members of BODs (PetroVN 
website, 2010). In other groups, BODs’ members are all people from the groups. 
Although the Decree 101/2009/ND-CP regulates “the chairman of the BODs may not 
concurrently work as director general of the parent company”, Mr. Pham Thanh Binh in 
Vinashin holds two positions of BODs’ chairman and CEO at the same time (Vinashin website, 
2010). Dr.Cuong-CIEM explains that in most of SEGs, there exists the distinction between the 
chairman of BODs and the general director (CEO), except for the Vinashin with the pilot model 
of which the chairman of BODs also hold the position of CEO (2009).  
Responsibilities of BODs are regulated in the Article 22 of Decree 101/2009/ND-CP: 
- To elaborate and submit to the Prime Minister for approval and organize the impleme
ntation of, the parent company's strategies and long-term plans; to decide on the paren
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t company's annual plans after obtaining the line ministry's comments; to decide on st
rategies, long-term plans and business lines of affiliate companies whose charter capit
al is wholly owned by the parent company.  
- To decide on investment projects included in the SEG's development planning and 
long-term plans already approved by the PM; to authorize the parent company's 
director general or representatives of the parent company's capital portions in other 
enterprises to decide on investment in projects included in plans it has approved.  
- To decide on projects on investment in. contribution of capital to. or purchase of 
shares from other companies, and on sale, under law. of the parent company's assets 
which are valued up to 50% of the remaining total asset value stated in the parent 
company's latest financial statement.  
- To decide on borrowing, lending, hire or lease contracts and other economic contracts 
of a value exceeding the parent company's charter capital under law. 
- To decide on appointment, re-appointment, dismissal, commendation, disciplining of 
or entry into or termination of labor contracts with, the director general after 
obtaining the Prime Minister's approval… 
- To decide on appointment, re-appointment, dismissal, commendation, disciplining of 
members of Members' Councils or presidents or controllers of one-member Ltd. 
companies whose charter capital is wholly held by the parent company; to approve 
proposals of Members' Councils or presidents of one-member Ltd. companies on 
appointment, re-appointment, dismissal, commendation, disciplining of these 
companies' directors general or directors. 
- To adopt plans on use of after-tax profits or offsetting of losses in the course of 
business operation proposed by the director general in compliance with the parent 
company's financial management regulation.  
- To inspect and supervise the director general, deputy directors general, directors of 
attached units 
- To inspect and supervise the Members' Council or presidents and controllers of one-
member Ltd. companies whose charter capital is wholly held by the parent company, 
representatives of the parent company's capital contributions in other enterprises  
- To exercise the rights and perform the obligations of the owner or owner of shares in 
affiliate companies.  
- To adopt the following for the CEO’s decision: Guarantee for each loan of an affiliate 
company which is bigger than the charter capital of this company; Contribution of 
capital for establishing new joint-stock companies or Ltd. companies with two or 
more members; Hire or lease contracts, borrowing or provision of loans bigger than 
the charter capital of affiliate companies wholly held by the parent company… 
Control Board (CB) of a mother company 
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SEGs (and some certain corporations) must have a Control Board (also known as the Inspection 
Committee) that supervises the CEO and assistant apparatus. 11   The Article 26 of Decree 
101/2009/ND-CP regulates Control Board (CB) of the mother company: 
1. The CB shall be set up by the BODs and composed of between 3 and 5 members, with 
its head being a member of the BODs and assigned by the latter. Other members of the 
CB shall be selected, appointed, re-appointed or dismissed by the BODs.12  The chairman 
of the BODs or the CEO may not concurrently act as head of the CB.  
2. The term of office of a member of the CB is 5 years. Members of the CB may be re-
appointed and are entitled to salaries, bonuses or allowances decided by the BODs  
3. The CB shall operate under a regulation approved by the BODs, and has the following 
tasks, powers and responsibilities:  
a) To inspect and supervise the lawfulness and truthfulness of the management and 
administration of business operations, recording of accounting books and financial 
statements, and observance of the parent company's charter, the BODs’ resolutions and 
decisions, and decisions of the chairman of the BODs concerning the parent company and 
affiliate companies; to take responsibility before the BODs for the exercise of its vested 
rights and assigned tasks;   
b) To perform tasks assigned by the BODs, report on inspection and supervision results 
to the BODs on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis and on a case-by-case basis; to 
promptly detect and report to the BODs on abnormal activities against corporate 
governance regulations or elements of illegal acts committed within the parent company 
and affiliate companies whose charter capital in wholly invested by the parent company; 
c) To refrain from disclosing inspection and supervision results before obtaining the 
permission of the BODs; to take responsibility before the BODs and law for its acts of 
tolerating or covering up violations. 
4. A member of the CB must fully satisfy the following criteria and conditions:  
a) Permanently residing in Vietnam:  
b) Being physically fit, honest and upright, and having good ethical quality and a good 
sense of law observance;  
c) Possessing a university or higher degree and being an expert in the accounting, audit, 
economics or finance domain or having professional expertise relevant to the parent 
company's business lines; being knowledgeable about law; having a service seniority of 
at least 5 years in the said domain; having no previous conviction or criminal charge for 
economic crimes;  
d) Being not a spouse, child, parent or blood sibling of a member of the BODs, the CEO, 
the chief account or cashier of the parent company;  
e) Working on a full-time basis and not concurrently holding a leading post in the state 
apparatus. 
                                                 
11 The Enterprises Law of 2005 requires that a Control Board must be established when a shareholding company has 
more than 11 individual shareholders or one (or more) organization shareholder(s) holding more than 50 % of the 
equity capital. 
12 For the members of the Control Board, the Law of Enterprise 2005 regulates that “more than half of the CB must 
reside in VN, and at least one member is an accountant or auditor” and “members of the CB may not hold the 
managerial positions in the company; shall not necessarily be shareholders or employees of the company”. 
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CEO (General Director) of the mother company 
The Article 27 of Decree 101/2009/ND-CP regulates about CEO of a parent company: 
1. The CEO is the at-law representative of the parent company, unless otherwise decided 
by the Prime Minister at the request of the BODs; administers the parent company's 
day-to-day operation according to its objectives and plans and the BODs’ resolutions 
and decisions; and take responsibility before the BODs and law for the exercise of 
his/her vested powers and performance of his/her assigned tasks. 
2. The CEO is appointed, reappointed, dismissed, commended or disciplined by the 
BODs which also may sign or terminate a labor contract with him/her after obtaining 
the Prime Minister's written approval. The parent company's charter must specify 
criteria and conditions for the CEO. 
3. The CEO is appointed or enters into a labor contract for a term of office of 5 years. 
The BODs shall decide on re-appointment of or renewal of the labor contract with the 
CEO after obtaining the Prime Minister's approval.  
4. The BODs shall decide on dismissal of or early termination of the labor contract with 
the CEO after obtaining the Prime Minister's approval in the following cases:  
a) He/she lets the parent company suffer from losses for two consecutive years or fail to 
achieve the set target ratio of profit to the owner capital for two consecutive years or in 
an intermingled loss and profit-making state without any remedy, except for cases in 
which a loss or lower ratio of profit to state-invested capital has been approved by a 
competent authority; loss has been anticipated due to investment in production 
expansion or technology renewal under resolutions or decisions of the BODs; a loss or 
lower ratio of profit to state-invested capital is caused by objective circumstances 
which have been explained to and approved by a competent authority;… 
b) The parent company falls into bankruptcy but fails to file bankruptcy requests under 
the law on business bankruptcy;  
c) He/she fails to fulfill obligations or targets assigned by the BODs; repeatedly and 
systematically violate resolutions and decisions of the BODs and operation regulation 
of the parent company;  
d) He/she dishonestly exercises his/her powers or abuses his/her position and powers to 
earn profits for him/herself or for another person; has made untruthful reports on the 
parent company's financial status;… 
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Chapter 3: Issues in diversification and corporate governance of Vietnamese 
state economic groups 
In chapter 2, the study provided information on current diversification and corporate governance 
of SEGs. This chapter is to find out existing problems in their massive unrelated diversification. 
Additionally, this chapter also shows common corporate governance challenges of SOEs as well 
as holding company (mother-subsidiary) structure before examining shortcomings of SEGs’ 
corporate governance. Basing on the perception of problems, the study will make suggestions to 
improve diversification pattern and corporate governance of SEGs in the next chapter.  
3.1. Issues in current diversification and performance of Vietnamese SEGs 
3.1.1. Neglect of the main business  
According to the survey of 200 biggest enterprises in Vietnam by United Nation Development 
program (UNDP), “many enterprises including economic groups are speculating securities and 
real estate whilst neglecting the core business”(My Dung, 2008). As leading players in respective 
industries, SEGs should invest their resources to enhance technology and productivity. However, 
they often jump into other unrelated fields while they neglect upgrading their main business. 
“Economic groups now tend to run after short term profits…the groups have not been going in 
the right directions, while neglecting the investments to upgrade technologies and 
competitiveness” (Le Dang Doanh, cited in VietNamNetBridge (2), 2008).  
SEGs were formed to become the backbone of economy, thus they are funded by the 
government and have to concentrate on core areas in which they have advantage. However, 
many SEGs have not accomplished their main function. The Vietnam Academy of Finance (2009) 
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shows that PetroVN has operated for many years but most of their products are crude oil exports 
to foreign countries while Vietnam has to import 100 percent of the gasoline used for 
manufacturing. For Vinatex, they have to import most of their manufacturing material. Moreover, 
not only are their products marked with the names of foreign brands but 80 percent of their 
products’ value is also from foreign countries. EVN has a responsibility to develop the national 
electrical system but they have not focused on their main area. Instead, they have diversified 
investments to many other areas such as finance, post-office, and real estate while a lack of 
electricity for society’s manufacture and household use occurs every year without remedy. One 
such instance was in 2008 when the government designated to EVN the responsibility of 
developing many important power projects in the period of 2008-2010 (Son La, Huoi Quang, 
Ban Chat, Uong Bi II…) (EVN, 2008). EVN had to “conduct negotiations with commercial 
banks to sign credit contracts on funding” and these projects needed such a huge amount of 
investment capital that they made “the capital pressure on these commercial banks” 
(VNbusinessnews, 2008). However, while those power projects had not got enough required 
capital, EVN did not optimally utilize its own funds and still tried to invest in other unrelated 
areas. For example, EVN needed VND 3,360 billion for Uong Bi II project which was started on 
23 May 2008 and still in a fund raising process until finishing (EVN, 2008). Nevertheless, EVN 
with An Binh Bank and REE Corporation established EVN Finance Joint Stock Company on 8 
July 2008 with the charter capital of VND 2,500 billion in which EVN contributed 40 percent 
(VinaCorp, 2009). The diversification to unrelated areas of EVN was so aggressive that the 
Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai had to ask “EVN to stop injecting money in non-
electricity projects to focus on power plant projects” (VNbusinessnews, 2008). 
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3.1.2. Scattering of resources and weak competitiveness 
In theory, business diversification that brings maximum profit with minimum cost to the owners 
should be seen as a good thing and should be encouraged. However, Vietnamese SEGs should 
not diversify their business spontaneously without considering their capability. Nguyen Dinh 
Cung (CIEM), said that: “Every business should have a forte business field, where it can gather 
its strength before thinking of expanding its business into other fields.” (cited in 
VietNamNetBridge (1), 2008). Vu Viet Ngoan (National Assembly’s Economics Committee) 
also has a similar view point: “there are problems with massive investments by SEGs. The 
groups should concentrate their labor force and financial strength on their main business 
operations to promote their competitive edges. However, they are running after short-term profit, 
jumping into non-forte business fields, which is leading to strength dilution”(cited in 
VietNamNetBridge (3), 2008).  
Practice shows that SEGs have not built up their own strong area to compete with other 
players in the market. At the same time, the resources of government and groups are limited. 
Thus, they should not scatter the limited wealth in many areas, as they weaken their 
competiveness by doing so. However, the following situation often happens in reality: in 2008, 
the Vietnamese government had to borrow from the global finance market to support Vinashin in 
order to develop shipbuilding. However, Vinashin used its funds to invest in securities, banking, 
insurance, and real estate with VND 3,323 billion (equal to 1.1 times of its equity) (Academy of 
Finance, 2009). The opinion of Doctor Pham Tri Hung, Vietnam Marketing and Management 
Institute, expresses: “There are some warnings about recent diversification of SEGs when they 
try to invest in finance, bank, real estate… It is not necessary for economic groups to develop 
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multiple businesses. They need to specialize in the key industry because their resource is 
limited”(2009).  
3.1.3. Taking high risk and low efficiency 
Vu Viet Ngoan (2008) warned that SEGs with their current diversification are exposing 
themselves to high risks and low efficiency: 
“They are exposing themselves to very high risks as they are injecting money in 
unfamiliar fields. They wrongly think that securities and banking can bring fast and quick 
profit. … In general, economic groups now have two problems. First, as they are 
investing in too many fields, they cannot get high efficiency on their investments. 
Secondly, they are making mistakes…as they are investing in unfamiliar fields, with 
which they are facing high risks” (cited in VietNamNetBridge (3), 2008). 
Vinashin is a typical example for such inefficient investment of SEGs. In 2007 when the 
establishment of subsidiaries exploded among SEGs, Vinashin surpassed other groups with 147 
subsidiaries and affiliates. According to a statistic of Ministry of Finance in 2007, on average, 
one subsidiary of Vinashin was formed on every 1.69 days. However, two years later, many of 
those subsidiaries and affiliates were facing loss, debt burden, and bankruptcy (Ngoc Lan, 2010).  
The actual operational results of SEGs in 2008 show their current high risk expressed by 
high debt to equity ratio and low liquidity. Academy of Finance (2009) pointed out that SEGs’ 
debt to equity ratio and the ratio of overdue loans are high and have already gone beyond a safe 
range. The actual liquidity of some companies is low compared to their book value. Many 
companies had a debt to equity ratio larger than 3 times, and some even had a ratio larger than 20 
times, such as 21.8 times for Vinashin. 
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Also presented in the performance report of Vietnamese SOEs (31/12/2008), SEGs’ 
performances were not good; all the groups did not accomplish their plan in terms of both sales 
and profit. 13 
Figure 2: Performance results of SEGs in 2008 
  Thousand billions of VND 
SEGs Sales 
Achievement 
rate compared 
to plan 
Earnings 
before tax 
Achievement 
rate compared 
to plan 
PetroVN 144.260 77.0% 25.200 47.8% 
EVN 27.777 0.470 58.0% 
VNPT 23.706 44.6% 6.225 49.8% 
Vinacomin 15.405 59.0% 1.550 51.0% 
Vinashin 15.405 79.0% 0.375 57.2% 
Vinatex 10.744 50.0% 0.187 29.0% 
VRG 5.153 42.9% 1.844 63.5% 
Source: the Department of Enterprise Reform and Development, Cited in Vietnamese Finance 2008 (2009), 
Academy of Finance – Finance Science Institute, Hanoi: Finance Publishing House. 
 According to the report of the State Bank of Vietnam (31/12/2008), the total debt of the 
above seven SEGs in credit institutions was VND 128,786 billion, increased 20,54% compared 
to 2007. The total overdue loan was VND 4,168 billion (equal to 3.24% of their total credit 
balance in those credit institutions), 15% of which was unrecoverable bad debt (Le Nhung, 2009). 
 Most of SEGs’ investment in securities, banking, insurance, and investment fund got loss. 
At the end of 2008, the amount of investment capital in securities of EVN was VND 214 billion; 
the amount of investment capital in investment fund of Petro VN was VND 368.9 billion, of 
VRG was VND 271 billion, of Vinashin was VND 144 billion and all of those investments did 
not get any profit (Le Nhung, 2010).  
                                                 
13 It is not easy to get financial data of SEGs as they are not public companies and their actual financial data is 
confidential. Usually for SOEs and SEGs in Vietnam, their operation is assessed at the end of a year basing on their 
plans established in the beginning of the year to submit to their supervision body. 
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It is normal for any new business project to not bring in profit during the beginning 
period. Therefore, SEGs might argue that their investments in securities, banking, insurance, and 
investment fund are not all wrong. However, the noted point is that SEGs are still weak in their 
main business lines where they have many advantages compared to other market players. While 
having not fulfilled their main business obligation, being in short of financial and managerial 
resource, being stuck in bad performance and high debt ratio, SEGs still largely extend 
investment in other unrelated risky areas. Thus, such unrelated investments increase the bad 
business situation of SEGs and are partly responsible for the poor performance.  
3.1.4. Conflict of interests between SEGs and banks 
The major concern is if groups can obtain control right in banks or other deposit-taking 
institutions (which are joint stock companies in current SEGs’ situation), they can influence 
these banks to give preferential credit for their own diversification and expansion projects. It is 
more possible for the groups to do so if the government’s supervision is not strong and efficient. 
Actually, the State Bank of Vietnam “has not efficiently controlled banks so that many banks 
hold so few fixed-income assets and a lot of risky ones, strongly depending on stock and real 
estate markets, leading the whole banking system to face risks (Thu Loan, 2008).  
In the bank-included model of groups, if government does not have a strong system of 
prudential regulation and supervision, the banks under the influence of the group may provide 
preferential credit for the group’s subsidiaries while refusing to extend loans to outside 
companies which may have more profitable and efficient projects. This situation can be seen as 
inefficient allocation of capital and causes a conflict of interest between the group and their 
banks. Moreover, it also results in discrimination between the groups’ subsidiaries and outside 
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companies in accessing credit. Additionally, it might make the banking sector more unstable 
when banks in the system become more vulnerable. 
The situation is more likely to occur under the current poor competition of Vietnam’s 
banking market and the availability of government’s support for banks. “If a bank becomes 
financially distressed, the central bank is likely to provide liquidity support to that bank or 
initiate its merger with another bank (or do both), to ensure that the problem bank does not cause 
a systemic crisis” (ADB, 2009). Because there is lack of threat on bankruptcy, economic groups 
and their banks can lend to groups’ projects without thorough consideration of efficiency and 
profit target for banks. More than that, the potential support of government for banks can 
encourage banks to take more risk which can lead to a bank crisis - a systematic risk (Leaven and 
Levine, 2009) because shareholders might share the upside gain, but might not worry about 
sharing the downside loss (Nam, Kim & Cuong, 2010). 
The separation of commercial and financial interests ensures investment projects to be 
subjected to double scrutiny: by the business entity which wants to undertake the project and by 
the financial entity which decides to provide loans for it. “Lack of separation implies that those 
who consider a project worth undertaking will be supporting it from both the borrowing end and 
the lending end. Under these circumstances, a dubious investment decision can be pursued for 
very long, with additional funding being provided to cover losses even if the chances to ever 
recover the investment are thin” (World Bank, 2009). If SEGs would control over banks or 
deposit-taking institutions, they would reduce the need to develop bankable projects and “allow 
poor investment decisions to be pursued way beyond what is reasonable” (World Bank, 2009). In 
practice, “the combination of commercial and financial interests under the same roof…has been 
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repeatedly associated with economic crises in middle-income countries. Chile in 1982-83 and 
several East Asian countries in 1997 illustrate the risks involved” (World Bank, 2009). 
3.1.5. Weak management in new unrelated business fields 
Among the diversification model of SEGs, such fields as finance, banking, securities, and real 
estate have not only distracted their resources, affected their main businesses, and caused more 
risk in their operation, but also induce a weak management in the new business areas.  
Extensive diversification into unrelated fields often parallels with a significant increase in 
the number of affiliated companies which are far different from the existing ones in terms of 
operation and management methods. It is said by MPI Vietnamese Delegation (2009) that the 
rapid increase in the number of affiliate companies can make SEGs difficult to manage diverse 
investment in their groups. The massive investment in unrelated areas easily leads to the failure 
of properly managing subsidiaries and thus can cause risk for the internal finance of the group. 
Difficulty in managing and in making investment decision is easy to understand because the 
mother companies don’t have enough specialized and qualified staff in such risky fields as bank, 
finance, securities and real estate.  
3.2. Common corporate governance problems of SOEs and holding company structure 
3.2.1. Common corporate governance problems of SOEs 
There are some common corporate governance problems found in SOEs. Those usual problems 
include passive ownership by the state due to state’s multiple roles which leads to a conflict of 
objectives (Nam, 2009; Asish, 2009; Simon, 2006); a complex chain of agents (non-identifiable 
principals) or many governmental bodies influence SOEs known as plethora of control (OECD, 
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2005; World Bank 2006; Nam, 2009; Simon, 2006; Asish 2009); government’s protection from 
the threats of takeover and bankruptcy which reduces incentive of boards and managers (World 
Bank, 2006; Nam, 2009; Baygan, 2005); boards with little authority, bypassed by shareholders 
and managers, or nominated by politically-based appointees (Simon, 2006); undue political 
influence on CEOs (CEOs trying to benefit the politicians who support them rather than 
maximizing the profits of SOEs (Nam, 2009); insufficient tools to incentivize and discipline 
management (compensation, termination, takeover, bankruptcy) (Simon, 2006). 
 Correspondingly, key elements to promote good corporate governance in SOEs are 
improving the ownership function of the state, making the objectives of SOEs clear, improving 
the transparency of SOEs’ performance, and empowering SOE boards and 
incentivizing/disciplining managers (Nam, 2009; Simon, 2006). 
3.2.2. Common corporate governance problems of holding company structure 
A holding (mother-subsidiary) company structure is a pyramid ownership structure which 
increases the disparity between control rights and cash flow rights. Some controlling 
shareholders can grasp control right worth vastly more than their contributed wealth by holding 
controlling interests in companies which hold controlling interests in other companies (Morck, 
Strangeland and Yeung, 1998; Hwang, 2001). Such disparity brings about expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders (through arranging internal transactions that 
benefit the subsidiaries with high ownership stakes at the expense of those with low ownership 
stakes), lower firm value, and poor operating performance (Nam, Kim and Cuong, 2010; Hwang, 
2001). Moreover, pyramid control structure may exacerbate agency problem, give incentive to 
the controlling shareholders to expand “his” business group to build a corporate empire (Hwang, 
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2001; Morck, Strangeland and Yeung, 1998), and facilitate the concentration of economic power 
(Morck and Yeung, 2004). 
If a holding company structure exerts centralized form (as Korean Cheabols with 
centralized multidivisional form) in which the mother company centralizes operating as well as 
strategic and financial decisions, it will not foster accountability of affiliates as the boundary of 
accountability becomes ambiguous between affiliates and the mother company (Hwang, 2001). 
The mother company might deeply intervene into management of subsidiaries, which reduces the 
autonomy and incentive of subsidiaries.  
3.3. Issues in current corporate governance of Vietnamese state economic groups 
SEGs are the main hope of the whole country’s economy. They should have high operating 
quality due to support policies from the government. However, their operation reveals many 
weaknesses, raising the question of why and where those shortcomings can arise. The causes of 
their outstanding issues come from both the weak monitoring of the government on SEGs and 
the poor internal corporate governance of SEGs. 
3.3.1. Shortcomings in the government’s supervision on SEGs 
Conflicting objectives 
As other SOEs, Vietnamese SEGs also face a common problem of conflicting objectives owing 
to multiple roles of the government both as the owner and the policy regulator. Currently, SEGs 
are under the control of Prime Minister and many other ministries. Those individuals and 
agencies assume both ownership and regulatory functions on SEGs and those functions usually 
conflict each other. Thus, the government has to choose the most important target and scarify the 
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others in each particular period. For example, the government has monitored SEGs to implement 
some missions of curbing inflation, stabilizing the macro-economy, providing products or 
services with subsidized-price, which makes SEGs suffer huge loss (Vietnam Academy of 
Finance, 2009). Such conflict of objectives does not give incentives to SEGs and makes the 
performance assessment of SEGs become more difficult.  
A complex chain of agents 
As another common problem of SOEs, there are many government agencies taking part in 
supervising and managing SEGs. The function of and cooperation between the owners, namely 
the state and other responsible ministries or government organizations, is often complicated and 
unclear. The part 2.2.2 a) of this study showed the current complicated assignment of tasks and 
powers to exercise the state owner's rights on SEG’s mother company and assignment of tasks to 
perform supervision on SEGs. There are Prime Minister, line ministries, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Planning and Investment, Ministry of Home Affairs, The Ministry of Labor War 
Invalids and Social Affairs and others probable organizations directly involved in supervision of 
SEGs. Multiple agencies and individuals involved in the groups’ performance at the same time 
leads to overlapped monitoring and supervision over SEGs. Consequently, this brings about 
awkwardness, delay, and even conflict in applying regulations, asking approval, and therefore 
reduces the performance quality of SEGs. 
Vacuum of legal regulation and policies 
For the task of regulating the establishment, organization and operation of the economic groups, 
the current legal framework is insufficient (Cuong, 2009). Moreover, because some economic 
groups are monopolies, “a well functioning regulatory system must also be established to set the 
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level of their service charges and prevent unfair trading practices” (Nam, Kim, and Cuong, 2010). 
Additionally, another set of regulations is needed to improve ownership structure and 
transparency of holding company structure. Furthermore, many subsidiaries of mother 
companies are equitized and if there is not appropriate monitoring mechanism, minority 
shareholders of those subsidiaries might concern about facing the risk of expropriation by 
controlling shareholders. Thus, regulations to protect minority shareholders should be also 
established to attract outside investors. Besides, SEGs may confront other common corporate 
governance problems of holding structure as well and thus need a strong regulation in those 
aspects. 
3.3.2. Shortcomings related to BODs and CEO of mother companies 
Firstly, there exists inadequate management capacity in SEGs. Recently, the management ability 
of BODs and CEO is deficient in terms of both quality and quantity (NCEIF, 2007). Even though 
the study has not found out influence of politics on nominating BODs or CEO, it should be noted 
that the current process of appointment, dismissal, evaluation, and compensation of the groups’ 
managers is dominated by bureaucrats. “Once it is in conflict with the interests of bureaucrats, 
there is the risk that this process can be compromised” (Nam, Kim, and Cuong, 2010).  
Secondly, there is a bureaucrat participation in BODs. Sometimes bureaucrats are directly 
involved in the management of SEGs. That is the case of Petro Vietnam when the Vice Minister 
of Finance and Vice Minister of Industry and Trade take the part of Board members. According 
to Nam, Kim and Cuong (2010), such micro-management by bureaucrats is harmful for SEGs on 
a number of ways:   
Firstly, governmental agencies may have policy objectives that may not be compatible 
with profit maximization. When the two contradict, bureaucrats will pursue the objective 
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of governmental agency at the expense of SEGs’ interest. Secondly, bureaucrats normally 
do not have the knowledge or the experience to make decisions on business matters so 
that decisions may be unnecessarily delayed. Thirdly, governmental agencies may favor 
managers that are obedient to them. These managers, however, are not necessarily the 
most competent ones. Fourthly, bureaucrats may pursue their own personal interests by 
misusing their power over economic groups.   
Thirdly, there is no attempt to introduce “non-executive members that are independent 
from line ministries and at the same time representing the public interest” into BODs of SEGs. In 
addition, “no rules exists disqualifying board members that directly or indirectly have business 
relationship with the company they serve” (Nam, Kim, and Cuong 2010). 
Fourthly, relating to compensation of SEGs’ managers. Vietnam has introduced a 
payment mechanism based on performance and target-achievement for SOE managers. However, 
the current compensation structure may “distort the incentives of managers. For instance, 
performance-based pay is structured so that it increases with the amount of self-mobilized 
capital.14 Since self-mobilized capital includes debt capital, it may give managers the wrong 
incentive to build up excessive leverage” (Nam, Kim, and Cuong 2010). Also, payment is not 
based on long-term performance, but solely based on prior year’s performance. This may induce 
managers to make myopic business decisions (Nam, Kim, and Cuong 2010). 
3.3.3. Shortcomings in subsidiaries and the mother–subsidiary relation of SEGs 
SEGs have shifted to the mother-subsidiary model which allows the separation in performance 
and responsibility of the mother company and subsidiaries and gives more autonomy to these 
affiliated companies. However, this model is still new for SEGs since they used to run in an 
                                                 
14 Accoring to Cuong (2009) and Nam, Kim, Cuong (2010), in case of performance-based pay, the management can 
collectively receive up to 5 percent of after-tax profit times (self-mobilized capital / total capital). This pay is subject 
to a yearly upper ceiling of VND 200 million (for companies without the BODs) or VND 500 million (for 
companies with the BODs).  In case of target-completion pay, the management can collectively receive up to 2.5 
percent of after-tax profit times (self-mobilized capital / total capital).  This pay is subject to a yearly upper ceiling 
of VND 100 million (for companies without the BODs) or VND 250 million (for companies with the BODs). 
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administrative “superior–subordinate” pattern for long time. SEGs have not adapted to the new 
model and their current internal governance exposes some weaknesses that should be changed to 
obtain better performance.   
Regarding directors and managers of subsidiaries 
Similar to the shortcoming of BODs and CEO in mother companies, the inadequacy in 
both quality and quantity of directors and managers, lack of independent directors, disincentive 
payment structure also exists in subsidiaries so that the management force has not afforded to the 
groups’ development (NCEIF, 2007; MPI VN delegation, 2009). 
Organizational mechanism 
Regarding mother companies, the monitoring method that they apply on subsidiaries still 
inclines to dictate rather than management toward economic benefit. The mother companies still 
keep their old “superior-subordinate” perception with inadequate compliance of subsidiaries’ 
regulations of investigation and observation. Some senior officers’ activities incline to order or 
mandate and lack instruction or support for the subsidiaries as shareholders” (MPI Vietnamese 
delegation, 2009).  
With regard to subsidiaries, some of them are inactive in their decisions and operation. It 
is a common occurrence in most SOEs as they passively operate under subsidized and 
administrative mechanism for a long time. Their change to the holding company model has been 
only in name and not in operation (VOVNews, 2008). In some cases, subsidiaries were afraid to 
make decisions for even investment projects on which they have authority (MPI Vietnamese 
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delegation, 2009). Because of the inactivation of subsidiaries, overload and inefficiency is 
obvious for the mother companies to deal with all aspects of management.   
In contrast, some subsidiaries are so aggressive that they exceed their authority. They 
don’t fully obey the regulations about reporting and asking approval from the mother company 
before making important decisions such as nominating senior personnel and organization 
structure (MPI Vietnamese Delegation, 2009). The numerous instances of subsidiaries exceeding 
their authority diminish the competence of mother company to manage those affiliated ones.  
The finding of the above weaknesses in both diversification pattern and corporate 
governance aims to seek appropriate solutions. SEGs only can have the correct direction when 
understanding exactly what has gone wrong. In the next chapter, the study will suggest 
recommendations basing on those shortcomings in order to strengthen SEGs to become leading 
players driving the whole economy.  
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Chapter 4: Suggestions to ensure efficiency and good corporate governance 
for Vietnamese state economic groups. 
Based on the existing shortcomings and the reasons for causing those problems, this chapter 
suggests solutions to ensure efficiency and good corporate governance for SEGs. In addition, 
experiences from Korea and China in terms of the government’s supervision on their business 
groups as well as their business groups’ practice on diversification will be discussed to derive 
lessons for Vietnam. However, before obtaining lessons to improve SEGs, it is important to 
address the question of whether Korea’s and China’s experiences are relevant for SEGs. In order 
to answer this concern, the similarities among Vietnamese, Korean, and Chinese business groups 
are mentioned in the aspects of establishment, ownership structure, and development direction.  
4.1. Establishment and development of business groups in Vietnam, China, and Korea 
Vietnam’s SEGs hold key positions in the national economy, operate in strategically important 
areas, and play a crucial role in stabilizing macro-economy and supplying substantial products. 
They receive support from the government and implement government strategies. The 
establishment of SEGs has based on the reform of SOEs. Large-scale state corporations were 
restructured according to the “mother-subsidiary” model to become SEGs. All of the groups have 
mother companies fully owned or mainly owned (Bao Viet) by the state. Vietnam is planning to 
establish new SEGs based on the same principles as existing ones. 
 China’s and Vietnam’s economies have a lot of similar characteristics which are 
prevalent in transition process, moving from centrally-planned to market-based economies with 
the vital position of SOEs. Vietnam has undertaken corporate reform through SOE equitization 
from 1995. In this process, SEGs have been formed since 2005 with the expectation to become 
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industrial leaders of the whole economy. Similarly, China’s economic reform was taken in 1980s 
and 1990s by SOE privatization. Chinese government made intensive endeavors to convert large 
SOEs into holding companies to cultivate business conglomerates for the national economy.   
 The reform of SOEs in China was taken along two lines. The first one is to expand 
enterprise autonomy and increase profit incentives by undergoing “the profit retention and profit 
contract systems (1979 to the early 1980s), the tax-for-profit system (1983 to 1985), and the 
contracted management system since 1986” (Lee & Mark, 1991; Yu, Ees & Lensink, 2008). The 
second one is to promote the restructuring and association of SOEs from 1978. In 1980, the State 
Council started to encourage “the formation of all kinds of economic alliance to break the old 
system of market partition and local government blockage” (Yu et al, 2008). “After observing 
the advantages of horizontal economic alliance, in 1986, the State Council issued “Regulations 
regarding a few problems related to the further promotion of horizontal economic alliance” in 
which the word “business group” first appeared in the state council’s official documents” ((Yu et 
al, 2008). “In 1991, the government issued “Information about selecting a patch of largest 
business groups as experimental units” and formed 57 business groups as the experimental ones 
for special promotion. The experimental business groups are required to form based on a core 
firm, and to develop shareholding relationship between firms” (Yu et al, 2008). 
After 1993, small and medium sized SOEs were allowed to be privatized according to the 
strategy of “holding on to the large and letting go of the small” to restructure and improve the 
performance of the SOEs. In 1997, the State Council promulgated “opinions on deepening the 
experimentation of the largest business groups” to require the experimental business groups to 
build up parent-filial system based on shareholding relationship (Yu et al, 2008). From 1997 to 
2001, the government further promoted the development of largest business groups in order that 
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they can play the pillar role in national economy and can compete with foreign firms (Yu et al, 
2008). In 2003, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC) was established. “The SASAC took the role of claiming property rights on 
behalf of the state… and has the power to appoint and remove the directors and managers and 
send supervision board to the large state-owned enterprises/business groups. Local state-owned 
enterprises/business groups are under management of local SASAC correspondingly” (Yu et al, 
2008).  
Currently, China has two types of business groups consisting of state-owned and non-
state-owned. If the parent corporation is a SOE, the business group is classified as state-owned 
and the remaining groups are classified into the second type (Ma & Lu, 2005). Those groups 
hold the key function in the China’s economy. The sales revenue of business groups account for 
more than 50 percent (nearly 80 percent in 2004 ) of  China’s GDP from 2000 to 2004, of which 
the state-owned business groups contribute the majority (Yu, Ees & Lensink, 2008). The state-
owned business groups also hold the dominant position in terms of total asset, sales revenue, and 
employment (more than 80% in 2004) (Yu, Ees & Lensink, 2008). 
South Korea has become famous for a rapid economic growth with the “Miracle of Han 
River”. One important reason has been the high degree of state intervention in the market 
economy, marked by the existence of both public and quasi-public enterprises (Kim, Kim, and 
William, 1994). During 1960s-1970s, Korean private entrepreneurs lacked the wherewithal to 
develop critical industries that were necessary to the nation's economic growth (Mongabay, 
2010). Hence, in order to develop strategic industries to foster national growth, the government 
supported some private firms through providing them generous policy loans and other incentives 
(Nam, Kim & Cuong, 2010; Mongabay, 2010; Jwa, 2009). Gradually, “the strong private firms 
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in the 60s had rapidly grown…and eventually becoming the today’s large conglomerates” – 
Chaebols (Jwa, 2009). “The Korean government offered these groups low-cost loans and other 
incentives to create corporations that could compete globally” (Keys & Campbell, 2002). 
For Korean SOEs, the “government started to differentiate SOEs that can be run on a 
commercial basis from those that cannot” in the mid-1980s (Nam, Kim & Cuong, 2010). The 
government allowed greater autonomy for the former, and introduced the Government-Owned 
Enterprise (GOE) Act of 1983 as well as established a supervisory board to oversee all the latter. 
By mid-1990s, the number of large-scale commercial SOEs grew significantly and the 
government decided to privatize those SOEs. Then, the Act on the Managerial Structure 
Improvement and Privatization of SOEs (1997) was promulgated to improve SOEs’ governance 
before their eventual privatization (Nam, Kim & Cuong, 2010).   
Korean national economy has grown along with the development of both SOEs and 
Chaebols who have been close to, and acted as implicit development partners of, the government 
(quasi-internal organizations - QIOs) (Nam (2), 2009). They received government’s support, 
carried out the state’s strategies and had many achievements in the nation’s important industries.  
Regarding the control system of business groups in China and Korea, the pyramid 
structure of Chinese business groups guarantees centralized control and giving the state more 
control rights than cash flow rights (Wantanabe, 2002). “According to the NBSC’s statistics in 
2004, 92.1% of parent firms of all Chinese business groups have the decision-making power”(Yu, 
Ees & Lensink, 2008). In contrast, Korean Chaebols are controlled by founder families and these 
founder families usually hold relatively insignificant ownership shares of their affiliated 
companies (Chung 2004; Yu, Ees & Lensink, 2008). 
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In terms of internal ownership structure, Chinese business groups’ structure is 
characterized by a simple hierarchy with a parent company at the top and the affiliates at the next 
tier while Korean Chaebols’s structure is more complicated, with owner family at the top, 
several core companies at the next tier playing the role of holding companies, and other affiliates 
at the bottom (Lee & Woo, 2001; Yu, Ees & Lensink, 2008).  
“In terms of the weight of the business groups in national economy, the share of the top 
20 business groups in China is not comparable to that of Korean Chaebols” (Yu, Ees & Lensink, 
2008). “The ratio of the aggregate sales revenue of the top 20 groups to the Chinese GDP in 
2004 is about 28.59% (NBSC 2004), whereas the similar ratio in Korea is 70.8% in 1987” (Yu, 
Ees & Lensink, 2008). 
In China, while state-owned business groups are more focused on their core business, 
non-state-owned business groups have a dissimilar diversification strategy. However, these 
private groups “entered only a few industries such as real estate, information and communication, 
and biotechnology, provided that the projects were attractive enough to get the bank loans” (Ma 
& Lu, 2005). Also in Korea, private groups Chaebols show an extensive diversification pattern 
while state corporations have a less diversifying model.  
Both state and private business groups and corporations in China and Korea have had a 
significant contribution to the development of national economies. Moreover, business groups 
and corporations of the two countries have many compatible characteristics to Vietnamese SEGs 
and “group formation in Vietnam is in infancy, and the inspiration seems to come from South 
Korea and China” (Abegaz, 2005). Thus, they are good models to give experiential lessons to 
improving Vietnamese SEGs. 
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4.2. Suggested solutions to ensure the efficiency of SEGs’ diversification. 
Chapter 3 examined weaknesses in SEGs caused by their current unrelated diversification. Those 
shortcomings consist of neglect of the main business, scattering of the resources and weak 
competitiveness, taking high risk and low efficiency, conflict of interests between banks and 
groups, and weak management in new unrelated fields. In order to suggest solutions to improve 
SEGs’ diversification, it is essential to explore reasons for their current massive unrelated 
diversification. 
4.2.1. Reasons for diversification of Vietnamese SEGs 
Diversification can be discussed in two types which are related and unrelated. Related 
diversification occurs when the firm expands into similar product lines and unrelated 
diversification takes place when the products are very different from each other (OECD, 1993). 
A firm can choose related diversification strategy when it wants to spread risks within related 
business activities; catching opportunities existing in a value chain; sharing common 
technologies, skilled labor, distribution channels or operating methods; achieving economies of 
scope by reducing costs when operating some businesses under one firm; achieving synergy 
when the combined effect is larger than the sum of parts; protecting from monopoly in 
intermediate product markets and attempting to deter new entry or expecting tax saving and 
circumvention of price controls, etc. However, when a cyclical downturn of the industry occurs, 
it is easier for a firm only diversifying to related businesses to fall in trouble than a firm 
diversifying to unrelated areas. 
On the other hand, unrelated diversification can bring some advantages such as spreading 
risks into different businesses to avoid “putting all eggs in one basket” that is stabilizing earnings 
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when the hard time of one industry is offset by the good time of the others; obtaining better 
internal financial resource allocation due to a better access of detailed and accurate information 
than external capital market; less  need for coordination among subsidiaries   (compared to 
related diversification) which helps to reduce intervention in the management of subsidiaries by 
the mother company and increase accountability of subsidiaries for their performance. However, 
unrelated diversification puts a burden on management which leads to the final argument that 
“consolidated performance of unrelated businesses tends to be no better than sum of individual 
businesses of their own or may be worse; unless managers are very talented and focused, 
unrelated diversification cannot be used to increase shareholder wealth compared to related 
diversification” (Arthur, 2009). 
There are some studies on reasons for diversification of a group, particularly business 
groups in emerging economies as discussions by Leff (1987), Goto (1982), Granovetter (1994)  
Ghemawat and Khanna (1998), Maitreesh and Raja (2000), Anurag and M. Akbar (2007). Those 
explanations relate to forming an internal market for a better resource allocation when external 
markets and institutions are not well developed (Leff, 1976; Ramirez, 1995; Williamson, 1979; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000); utilizing economies of scope (Rumelt, 1974) or economies of scale 
(Chandler, 1990), maximizing profit and spreading risks, etc. According to Nam (2001), reasons 
for diversification of business groups might fall into six main categories as shown in the Box 1. 
Box 1: Major motivations for diversification 
Generation and exertion of market power. With “deep pocket” (anticipated help from other 
members), subsidiaries of a business group may more easily adopt predatory pricing for the 
purpose of driving competitor out of the market. They may also show some non-competitive 
behavior collectively, as they frequently confront each other in wide range of markets. For 
instance, they may “mutually forbear” vigorous competition among themselves for fear of 
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retaliatory actions by other groups, while trying to foreclose markets for non-diversified 
firms. 
Pursuance of managers’ and owners’ interests (agency view). In large-scale firms with 
dispersed ownership, managers tend to pursue their own interests by diversified corporate 
expansion. This strategy increases not only managerial perquisites and pleasure of empire-
building but also their job security, since it would require more managerial resources and 
might lower the business risk as well. In contrast, in business groups with concentrated 
ownership or pyramidal ownership structure, diversification might serve the interests of 
controlling owners at the expense of those of minority (outside) shareholders. 
Creation of group-wide internal markets. In the early stage of development, factor markets, 
particularly the financial market, suffer from serious imperfections. In this situation, business 
groups would better be able to finance their new and existing business by mobilizing in-
group financial resources, since information asymmetry is less of a problem within a group. 
Facing underdeveloped labor market, they would also attempt to develop necessary human 
resources themselves and allocate them in a most efficient way within the groups. Here, 
business groups are viewed as an organizational response to the inefficient external factor 
markets, which are at least partially substituted with their own internal markets. 
Utilization of common resources and economies of scope. Another advantage related to the 
internal uses of resources is economies of scope: gains from sharing valuable assets, both 
tangible and intangible, within a diversified firm or group. These gains arise because, in spite 
of their value within a group, they either have little value or are rarely traded in the outside 
markets. Most important asset in this respect may be entrepreneurship, distinctively lacking 
in the early phase of industrialization. If entrepreneurship is indeed the key to business 
success, it is nature for diverse business undertakings to come under the management of a 
proven entrepreneurial talent. 
Reduction of business risk and portfolio optimization. Business diversification means 
reduced risk. In the absence of a well-developed capital market and limited financial 
resource, portfolio diversification is inadequate for the personal wealth of controlling 
families, and they might want their business to diversify instead. Diversification also helps 
tide over temporary business difficulties. It enables them to aggressively enter into risky 
business with a long gestation period. 
Capturing profit opportunities induced by government incentives or regulations. In many 
countries, business group grew rapidly in connection with government-initiated drive for 
industrialization that provided a wide-range of incentives including preferential credit, tax 
exemptions, and exclusive licenses. Eligible for these government-administered incentives 
were mainly large business. They kept adding new business in an effort to secure the 
subsidiaries as much as possible often with the belief that the government would have no 
other choice than bailing them out in the event of financial distress.  
Source: Nam Sang-Woo (2001), “Business Groups Looted by Controlling Families, and the Asian Crisis”, 
ADB Institute Research Paper 27, Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. 
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For Vietnamese SEGs, they are diversifying extensively into unrelated areas, especially 
finance, banking, real estate and securities, while neglecting their core businesses which are 
designated by the government and are key industries of the national economy. The question is 
why they all jump into unrelated business fields? What is the reason behind such massive 
activities?  
Among some major motivations for diversification, the current massive unrelated 
diversification cannot be explained by the argument of market power because SEGs mostly have 
monopoly in their main business and their unrelated subsidiaries seem too weak for them to 
strengthen their market power at least in the short run. Pursuance of managers’ interests by 
diversifying into business fields that managers have knowledge and experience to secure their 
job, increase potential of negotiating higher compensation and latitude in decision making 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) has no relevance either in the case of SEGs in Vietnam. It is because 
most of unrelated fields are newly emerged areas and far differ from the core business where 
managers usually work at. As for the operation of internal markets, internal capital and labor 
markets are two most important internal ones. However, it is difficult to utilize internal human 
resource among unrelated areas. Thus, it does not make much sense for SEGs to build up internal 
labor market. Additionally, continuously adding subsidiaries and affiliates to spread a net in as 
many fields as possible to get the government’s bailout in case they face bankruptcy is not 
necessary for Vietnamese SEGs. It is because they are operating in strategically important 
industries of the national economy and are selected by the government to get support. Hence, 
even they do not have any spreading net, they will get support and rescue from the government 
in case they are in financial distress.   
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Besides the above reasons, some CEOs of SEGs, as Dao Van Hung - Chair man of EVN, 
pretext that they need to diversify to such high profit fields as bank, securities, or real estate to 
obtain earnings to lift up the core business which is responsible for public interest (Phuong Loan, 
2008). However, trying massive unrelated diversification to boost the core business is also not 
reasonable since SEGs have enjoyed many incentives in their core fields (land, credit, 
resources…) for long time but they could not lift up the main fields. Now they suddenly claim 
that pursuing unrelated businesses is to push up the core one is not sensible. 
In contrast, the aggressive diversification into unrelated businesses of SEGs can be 
explained in some ways. Firstly, there might be a lack of competition in both their main 
businesses and unrelated fields. In the core businesses, SEGs virtually monopolize so that they 
do not need to put much effort to care for their competitive capability and improve their products 
and services. Thus, SEGs do not focus on the core businesses and use resources to invest in other 
fields. At the same time, the competition in current market of unrelated fields might be weak, too. 
This condition opens chance for many firms to entry and to operate easily, even those not 
specializing in such areas.  
Secondly, extensively diversifying especially into finance, banking, securities, and 
insurance might express SEGs’ need to build up an internal capital market. External capital 
market in Vietnam has not yet developed so that firms might get difficulty in accessing capital 
from external market. Even though SEGs are funded by the government, state budget allocation 
among many different uses might be imperfect so SEGs might feel that they need internal capital 
market for their own use.  
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Thirdly, SEGs might expect to take advantage of investment opportunities, achieve more 
profit, enlarge their industrial scale, and disperse business risk from their current diversification 
pattern. The period of 2007-2008 was a good time for securities, insurance, banking, and finance 
when these industries grew rapidly and achieved highest profit among industries of Vietnam’s 
economy. However, SEGs’ performance shows that they are neglecting the main business, 
scattering resources, taking high risk and low efficiency, and weak management ability. Even 
though the poor performance may be due to the costs of starting new businesses, it may very well 
be attributable to the lack of a clear long-term development strategy as well as a strong 
management capability and skill. This view is consistent with the weak management ability of 
BODs and CEO of mother companies as well as directors and managers of subsidiaries which 
was examined in part 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 of this thesis.     
4.2.2. Suggestions to ensure the efficiency of SEGs’ diversification. 
Based on problems of SEGs’ current unrelated diversification and the reasons explored, the 
questions arise to answer is “Should SEGs diversify?” And if yes “What area should they enter 
in their diversification pattern?” and “How much should they diversify?” 
As mentioned above, diversification is a good way to grasp the benefit of economies of 
scale and scope, reduce business risk, obtain more profit, etc. More specifically for Vietnam, the 
study of Abegaz (2005) on the innovative organizational model for large state enterprise reform 
found that the suitably–adapted diversified business group is a promising model for large-scale 
SOEs at the intermediate stage of corporate reform. The group-wise diversification model can 
help enterprise overcome market failures, high risk, high agency cost, “significant barriers to 
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cost-efficient acquisition and diffusion of technology information across firm boundaries” 
(Abegaz, 2005), scarce management skills, and inadequate publicly-provided infrastructure.  
However, it is noted that “poorly structured or regulated groups may bring potentially 
large welfare losses including … unjustifiable access to state financial capital, stifling 
competition from small firms and foreign investors, and frustrating effective monitoring” 
(Abegaz, 2005). Therefore, the main point is to make sure the efficient organizational groups to 
explore the “gold opportunity” in the under-developed market of Vietnam. If Vietnam 
government and its economic groups can do so, they can “stand a good chance of moving to the 
frontline of the “flying geese” of East Asian development” (Abegaz, 2005).  
Additionally, the practice of Korean Chaebols which are characterized worldwide with 
their diversification illustrates their achievement in diversification strategy as they are growing to 
become global business groups. The below table shows the diversification of Chaebols:  
Figure 3: Diversification of Korean Chaebols 
Average number of 
businesses 1993 1997 2000 2004 2008 
Big 30 business groups  18.3 19.8 15.3 14.1 17.5 
Big 5 business groups  31.2 30 25.4 21.8 27.2 
Source: Hwang (2009), “Korean business groups and diversification”, Proceeding from A study visit 
on Economic groups of Vietnam, KOICA-KDI School of Public Policy and Management. 
After the Asian crisis 1997, Chaebols reduced their diversification compared to before 
but the level of diversification was still high. After the global crisis 2008, Korea with the 
domination of Chaebols in the economy is one of a few countries in the world escaping from the 
crisis earliest. Hwang (Korea Economic Research Institute - Federation of Korea Industries) also 
suggests: diversification is a good path for economic groups as “eight arms can be better than 
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one arm in developing countries where institutional capital is in short supply”, with the added 
condition of having good corporate governance (2009). 
The conclusion is that Vietnam’s SEGs should diversify their business areas with an 
efficiently structured and governed group in mind.    
This, however, does not mean that SEGs should diversify into any business areas 
spontaneously as they want. Because in the current extensively unrelated diversification, SEGs 
are facing many drawbacks, thus the questions are “what area should SEGs join in?”and “how 
much should they diversify?” 
The answer is that SEGs should make a clear preferential order in their investment 
strategy in which they have to make the highest priority to concentrate on their main business; 
then, if their resources are available for diversification, they should prefer to invest in related 
businesses before thinking of unrelated ones; and, their investment in banks or credit-taking 
institutions and some such high risky areas as private equity or venture capital should be 
restricted. There are some reasons for SEGs to do so:  
Firstly, the purpose of the government is to establish SEGs operating in strategically 
important industries to become strong players in the global competitive market. Thus, it is not 
advisable for them to diversify while neglecting the core business which is designated by the 
government.  
Secondly, it is essential for every SEG to build its own strength in the core business, 
especially in the context that Vietnam must fully comply with WTO’s commitments soon. The 
government will not be allowed to support SEGs and have to ensure a level playing field for all 
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enterprises. SEGs will not be able to compete with other global business groups if they spread 
limited resources in many areas and do not ensure competitive strength in the core line in which 
they have advantages. Thus, the core business must be the highest priority of SEGs; then, if they 
are competent for diversification, they should prefer to invest in related businesses to strengthen 
their core line and benefit from economies of scope, opportunities in a value chain, and sharing 
common resources; after that, if their resources are still available for promising unrelated 
diversification, SEGs may enter in that area but with a thorough consideration on investment 
efficiency, profitability, and influence on the main business to avoid any negative effects. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the benefit of unrelated diversification compared to related 
diversification is questionable (Arthur, 2009) and some empirical studies showed that unrelated 
diversification reduces the shareholder’s value (Ferris, Kim & Kitsabunnarat, 2003; Nam, Kim & 
Cuong, 2010). 
Thirdly, as explained above, SEGs are expected to form an internal capital market. 
However, it should be noted that internal capital market can more efficiently allocate resources 
when a firm adopts a focused strategy involving closely related business because the holding 
company is more capable to rank investment opportunities across the affiliates only in that case 
(Stein, 2000; Paola, 2001; Khanna and Tice, 2001).  
Fourthly, when groups control banks or credit-taking institutions, it is easy to bring about 
the conflict of interests between groups and banks. Moreover, investing in high risky areas such 
as private equity or venture capital may put a huge influence on the main business.   
The experience from Korea shows that after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the 
surviving Chaebols restructured their operation and have mostly tended to diversify into related 
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business (Hwang, 2009). The trend concentrating on related business as an adjustment after the 
crisis can be a lesson for Vietnamese SEGs. More than that, experience of Korean state 
corporations such as KEPCO, POSCO, KOGAS shows that they utilize their resource to focus on 
core businesses and their diversification is mostly in related projects as well as research and 
development (KEPCO, 2003; POSCO, 2006; KOGAS, 2010) 
In China, the research of Ma and Lu (2005) on Chinese business groups “might surprise 
some readers, namely that Chinese business groups are less diversified than their counterparts in 
many other countries”. The state-owned groups’ diversification strategies “are more focused on 
their core businesses” and “this is partly due to pressures from the state that requires them to 
become the leading players or even national champions in their own industries” (Ma and Lu, 
2005). 
With regard to owning banks by groups, which can lead to the risk of conflicting interest 
between the groups and banks, it is noteworthy that “the risk exists regardless of whether the 
commercial interests are owned by the private or the public sector” (World Bank, 2009). In 
China, the commercial banks are not allowed to become shareholder of firms according to the 
Commercial Bank Law of China (Yu et al, 2008). According to Nam, Kim and Cuong (2010), 
the separation of commerce and banking has been a core principle of the U.S. and Korean 
governments for many decades. “Ownership of commercial banks should be restricted so that 
economic groups, whether they are state-owned or private, do not have control over them” (Nam 
Kim and Cuong, 2010).   
Box 2: Separation of commerce and banking in Korea 
In Korea, the principle of separating commerce (industrial capital) and banking (commercial 
banks) has been the maintained since 1982.  In 1982, the government wanted to privatize 
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commercial banks that has been in the hands of state for the past 20 years, but was also 
concerned with the problem of economic power being concentration in few chaebol families.  
This lead the government to impose an ownership limit of 8%.  That is, no shareholder, 
together with its specially related parties, can own more than 8% of commercial bank shares.  
In 1994, this ownership limit was relaxed and raised up to 12% for firms mainly engaged in 
financial business, but lowered down to 4% for others.  Immediately after the economic 
crisis, in 1998, the ownership limit was set again to be 4% regardless of the business the 
shareholder is in.  In 2002, the ownership limit was relaxed to 10%, but there was a 4% cap 
on voting rights.  In 2009, the cap on voting rights has been relaxed to 9%.  
Source: Nam, Kim, and Cuong (2010), “On the governance of state-owned economic groups in Vietnam”. 
Proceedings from “Senior Policy Dialogues and Dissemination Seminar”, Vietnam MPI 
On the side of the state, the Vietnamese government should give clear regulations and 
instructions on the principal business areas of SEGs as well as those fields that SEGs are allowed 
to invest in and how much they should invest. In case of making investment out of the 
permission, SEGs have to obtain approval from the government. This practice can give SEGs an 
apparent pathway and constitute the basis to perform the monitoring and supervision functions of 
the government on SEGs. The lessons from China confirm that “the Chinese government strictly 
controls the principal business domains of groups…, especially those domains that are influential 
to the economic security; the government also approves their intended outer investment” (CIEM, 
2009). 
In fact, the Vietnamese government promulgated some regulations on related issues, 
which is considered as a right action. The government issued Decree 9/2009/ND-CP15  and 
Decree 101/2009/ND-CP to restrict unrelated diversification of SEGs and SOEs. The Article 16 
of Decree 101/2009/ND-CP gives provisions on investment limitations and business lines of 
state economic groups: 
Parent companies and member enterprises of groups may register business lines under law 
but shall concentrate their investment on and conduct business operations within main 
business lines and related business lines… 
                                                 
15  Decree No. 09/2009/ND-CP dated February 5, 2009 on the Regulation on financial management of state 
companies and management of state capital invested in other enterprises 
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A parent company which, directly or through its affiliate companies, conducts business 
operations in business lines unrelated to main business lines must satisfy the following 
conditions:  
a/ It has fulfilled the task of conducting the main business lines assigned by the owner; 
conducting unrelated business lines will cause no impact on the performance of the main 
business lines as well as on their expansion and development 
b/ It uses business operations and results in unrelated business lines to support and develop 
the main business lines;  
c/ It performs the reporting obligation and submits to supervision by the state owner 
representative of investment, investment efficiency and impacts of business operations in 
unrelated business lines. 
Article 12 of Decree 9/2009/ND-CP regulates: 
SOEs are not allowed to contribute capital or buy shares from venture capital funds, equity 
investment funds, and securities companies…. SOEs have to use at least 70% of their total 
capital to make investments into activities belonging to their principal business domain. In 
particular for the sectors of banking, insurance and securities, SOEs are permitted to make 
their investment in the form of a capital contribution only to one enterprise per sector; the 
level of investment cannot exceed 20% of the receiving organization’s legal capital, and total 
contribution of parent company and of all subsidiaries cannot exceed 30% of the recipient 
organization’s legal capital. In an exceptional case of needing to surpass this level, the groups 
should submit its request to the Prime Minister for examination and approval.  
It is, however, not easy to strictly ensure the conformation of SEGs. Among the causes 
explored for SEGs’ massive unrelated diversification, one main cause is lacking competition in 
both the core businesses and unrelated fields. Thus, it is better for the government to address the 
issue from the root of problem rather than simply restricting SEGs. The problem can be 
improved significantly if the government pushes further competition in both the core businesses 
and the unrelated fields. If the government now does not want to release the key areas which is 
strategically important industries to private and foreign sectors, it can increase competition by 
allowing more state enterprises to operate in those areas. By that way, SEGs cannot continue 
enjoining monopoly, but focus more on improving their quality and productivity, and develop 
their core business.  
Moreover, the other reason for current SEGs’ diversification is forming an internal 
market because the state budget allocation might be inefficient and the external market is under-
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developed. Thus, the government also should develop a well-functioning capital market. Not 
only does it aim for a better credit allocation among the subsidiaries of SEGs but also for the 
benefit of the groups and their subsidiaries when they are equitized.   
4.3. Suggested solutions to ensure good corporate governance of SEGs. 
The shortcomings of SEGs’ corporate governance express themselves in both external 
government’s supervision and internal governance of the groups. The external factors attribute to 
conflict of objectives, a complex chain of agents, bureaucrat participation, and vacuum of legal 
regulations and policies. The internal factor relates to empowering BODs and CEO and the weak 
organizational mechanism. 
4.3.1. Suggested solutions for shortcomings in government’s supervision 
As for main challenges of managing and supervising SOEs, the key challenges needed to 
overcome the existing external shortcomings of SEGs are properly exercising the state ownership 
function and improving the transparency of SEGs’ objective and performance. 
It is stated clearly in the guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs by OECD (3) that 
“the state should act as an informed and active owner and establish a clear and consistent 
ownership policy, ensuring that the governance of SOEs is carried out in a transparent and 
accountable manner, with the necessary degree of professionalism and effectiveness” (2005). 
Correspondingly, the government should establish a clear ownership policy; let the exercise of 
ownership rights be clearly identified within the state administration; let the boards carry out 
their responsibilities without undue representation of government officers; and allow SOEs full 
operational autonomy to realize the defined objectives (OECD (3), 2005; Nam, 2009). In the 
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case of Vietnamese SEGs, this study suggests the government to improve the transparency of 
SEGs’ objective and performance; establish a specialized organization for supervising and 
exercising ownership rights toward SEGs; and improving governance structure and transparency 
of holding company structure.  
a) Improving the transparency of SEGs’ objective and performance 
Firstly, the government should re-clarify objective for SEGs basing on commercial and non-
commercial basis as the Korean government classified its SOEs in mid-1980s (Nam, Kim, and 
Cuong, 2010). In the current situation, some SEGs can entirely operate under profit-
maximization basis such as VNPT, Viettel, Vinatext, VRG, etc. If some SEGs have to carry out 
non-commercial activities, they should record those activities in separate financial accounts so 
“the performance of managers can be evaluated solely based on their commercial activities” 
(Nam, Kim, Cuong, 2010). In addition, the loss due to non-commercial activities should be 
compensated by state budget, so the possibility that economic groups loose incentive to improve 
their products’ quality due to setting subsidized (low) prices for certain social parts can be 
avoided. Also, the government should give greater autonomy to SEGs to run on a commercial 
basis to meet their objective.  
 Secondly, based on the defined objective of SEGs, the government as the owner should 
clarify SEGs’ targets by specific achievements or specific performance indicators in each period. 
Thus, SEGs can have a benchmark for their performance and the government supervision on 
SEGs’ can be more efficient and transparent.  
 Thirdly, along the SEGs’ practical performance, the government should cooperate and 
maintain continuous dialogue with “the state supreme audit institutions” (Nam, 2009), “external 
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auditors and specific state control organs” (OECD, 2005). Thus, the government can regularly 
oversee and update SEGs’ performance, and give timely oriented direction when necessary. 
b) Exercising the ownership function 
Models to exercise ownership function        
According to Vagliasindi (2008) and OECD (2) (2005), there are three models for a state to 
exercise the ownership function on SOEs: centralized, decentralized and duel models. The 
decentralized model is the most traditional one where SOEs are under the responsibility of 
relevant sector ministries. The main advantage of this model is a greater availability of sector 
expertise but it faces main drawbacks or dangers which are the difficulty in clear separation of 
ownership function from the regulatory role (industrial policy regulating) and the risk of 
government’s interference on SOE’s daily operation (Vagliasindi, 2008; Nam, 2009; OECD (2), 
2005). The dual model used to be the most common and is still adopted in many OECD countries 
where the responsibility is shared between the sector ministry and a “central” entity.  An 
important potential advantage of this model is the possibility of alleviating the conflict of 
ownership and regulatory functions by dividing the two roles to different ministries. Another 
advantage is that it can facilitate both technical and fiscal oversight. However, the main 
disadvantage is the potential for blurring responsibilities of involved ministries and the 
possibility that SOE management perceives itself to be “the servant of two masters”, with 
detrimental results for morale and performance (Vagliasindi, 2008). The centralized model has 
become more popular and often resulted from the recent implementation of privatization 
programs, in which the ownership responsibility is concentrated under one main agency. The 
main advantages of this model are the clear line of accountability from the SOE to the 
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government, the ability of the government to exert close fiscal supervision and to form a 
coherent SOE policy, and allowing the best use of limited human resources available to 
undertake the specialized job of exercising the government’s ownership function. The main 
disadvantage is the likelihood that the depth of available expertise in the one main agency will be 
shallower than in sectoral ministries (Vagliasindi, 2008; Nam, 2009).   
Apart from the three above models, there are other specific structures involved in 
exercising the ownership function of SOEs. They are holding companies and Ad hoc specialized 
consulting services (Vagliasindi, 2008; OECD (2), 2005). The later is in the form of specialized 
consulting companies, more flexible and independent from overall government policy. They give 
advices to the ownership entity within the government like SICOT in Italia, CCMAU in New 
Zealand, and GBPFAU in Australia (OECD (2), 2005). The holding company as IRI in Italia, 
OIAG in Australia, APV Rt. in Hungary is the model to which the ownership of SOEs has been 
transferred. These holdings are in turn owned by the state and under the responsibility of one 
ministry (Vagliasindi, 2008; OECD (2), 2005). This model aimed at decreasing political 
interference in the management of SOEs, giving more flexibility to their management, and 
introducing tougher budget constraints. This model has been prevalent in former transition 
economies because “it is also a vehicle to carry out privatization” (OECD (2), 2005). It, however, 
has shown limitations. It has not proven to be efficient either in terms of corporate restructuring 
or in financial management (Vagliasindi, 2008). Perhaps, it is now retained only in Australia but 
is closer to a centralized model. “The main advantage is the ability to facilitate a nationwide 
program for the privatization and restructuring of state‐owned industry. Its major disadvantage is 
that it does not by itself resolve the basic issues of poor corporate governance of SOEs. Instead, 
it simply relocates the problem to the level of the holding company. The question then becomes 
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how efficient and accountable the holding company is, and whether a centralized, decentralized, 
or dual system should be adopted to improve its performance” (Vagliasindi, 2008). 
Exercising ownership function in Vietnam 
Although there has not been a clear unified model for the state to exercise the ownership function 
toward SEGs, the current model of ownership exercising can be classified as decentralized model. 
Some SEGs are operating under the control of Prime Minister, Baoviet is under Ministry of 
Finance, Viettel is under Ministry of Defense while there are many other ministries also taking 
part in exercising the ownership function and supervising SEGs. Added to this, there is “no 
differentiation between the state ownership function and the governmental administration 
function of ministries” (Cuong, 2009). As main drawbacks of decentralized model examined 
above, the government faces the difficulty in clear separation of ownership function from the 
regulatory role. Therefore, the right and benefit of the state owner in SEGs have not been 
explored properly (MPI Vietnamese delegation, 2009).  
 Among the above mentioned models, this study suggests Vietnamese government to 
exercise the centralized one to better realize the state ownership right and separate ownership 
function from regulatory role on SEGs. This can be done by concentrating the ownership 
responsibility in one main governmental agency which acts as a state investor or shareholder in 
SEGs while other different ministries or agencies only exercise the governmental administration 
and regulatory role on SEGs. According to Vagliasindi (2008), “the OECD’s recommended 
model is for a centralized ownership function. The OECD goes even further in recommending 
the centralized ownership to be exercised by an independent agency, even though this model is 
relatively untested in practice both in developed and developing countries”. Furthermore, the 
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worldwide trend of reform is also away from the decentralized model and more towards the 
centralized model (OECD (2), 2005). 
 The centralized model is the study’s suggestion for Vietnamese government in the long 
run. In the short-term, when human resource and other conditions have not been favorable for the 
government to exercise the centralized model immediately, the study suggests organizing SEGs 
under the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC). 
SCIC in Vietnam 
The government established a special financial institution namely the State Capital Investment 
Corporation (SCIC) under Decision No. 151/2005/QD-TTg16 of the Prime Minister. SCIC is a 
for-profit organization in the form of a state corporation which “is mandated to exercise 
ownership rights in SOEs on behalf of the state” (World Bank, 2009). The establishment of 
SCIC by the government aims to continue SOE restructuring process and improve state 
investment mechanism toward market principle (Cuong, 2009). Added to this, the creation of the 
SCIC helps to “separate the ownership and regulatory functions of state agencies, thus reducing 
the scope for political interference in business operations while enhancing the process of 
privatization” (VCCI, 2007). According to the Decision 151 and SCIC portal (2010), some 
missions of SCIC include exercising state shareholder rights in state invested enterprises; 
managing state invested capital and generating added value and maximizing capital efficiency; 
and investing state capital in key industries with a view to preserving and maximizing the value 
of state capital. However, SCIC currently does not assume any responsibility on SEGs (SCIC, 
2009; Cuong, 2009). The study recommends expanding the role of SCIC so it can hold the 
                                                 
16 Decision No. 151/2005/QD-TTg dated 20th June 2005 on Establishment of SCIC. 
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ownership responsibility not only in SOEs but also over SEGs as SASAC in China, Temasek in 
Singapore, and Khazanah in Malaysia. When SCIC assume the role of state owner on SOEs and 
SEGs, this practice becomes similar to the holding companies model.   
Once SEGs are put under the control of SCIC, the role that currently carried out by Prime 
Minister and other ministries should be played by the BODs of SCIC. Thus, instead of 
controlling both SEGs and SCIC, Prime Minster will oversee SCIC only and in turn, SCIC will 
be responsible for SEGs. Currently, the BODs of SCIC includes “one leader of Ministry of 
Finance, leaders from other related Ministries who have deep knowledge in financial and capital 
investment as well as enterprise management” (Cuong, 2009). To minimize the conflict of 
interest in SCIC, the board should “not be represented by Ministries other than the Ministry of 
Finance, which is believed to be responsible for the management of state capital” (Nam, Kim and 
Cuong, 2010). Moreover, the study recommends hiring outside board members who represent 
public interest in SCIC. In the case of Korean GOE Management Evaluation Committee, the 
committee had “a number of civilians appointed by the President. The civilian committee 
members were non-resident members with sufficient knowledge and experience in the area of 
SOE management” (Nam, Kim and Cuong, 2010).   
However, it is noteworthy that the holdings model is a good model in privatization 
process but still contains more weaknesses than the centralized one and it does not thoroughly 
address the shortcoming of separating ownership and regulatory roles as expressed in other 
countries’ experience. Thus, in the long run, the government should make a further move from 
the holdings model to the centralized one. That is because “the holding structures remain an 
exception…where they are not supposed to be permanent structures, but should disappear with 
the completion of privatization and restructuring of industry” (OECD (2), 2005).  
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The shortcomings of holding company model are also expressed in SCIC as it is facing 
difficulties such as the fact that the number of enterprises from many different industries 
managed by SCIC goes beyond SCIC’s capacity (Cuong, 2009; VCCI, 2007); conflict of 
objectives when SCIC are controlling both bank and non-bank companies; potential conflict of 
priority when SCIC has both commercial and unprofitable social investment objectives; unclear 
corporate governance in which many government agencies are involed in SCIC; and not yet 
separating the onwership and regulatory roles of the government on SCIC (VCCI, 2007; Cuong, 
2009). Although this study does not go deeply in SCIC, some basic recommendations for SCIC 
are suggested as following.  
The government should consider establishing additional SCICs (Nam, Kim, Cuong, 2010) 
and SCIC should attract and retain more talent by implementing modern and commercial human 
resource policies, including competitive compensation and benefit packages (VCCI, 2007). Also, 
the government should separate banks from investment portfolio of SCIC as the Chinese SASAC 
does not combine commercial and financial interests under the same roof (World Bank, 2009). In 
case SCIC is mandated to manage both, “there is a need to establish an effective “Chinese wall” 
between the units managing these assets to ensure that conflicts of interest do not arise” (VCCI, 
2007).  
As common shortcoming of holdings structure in exercising ownership function of the 
state, fundamental conflict between the ownership function and the administrative management 
function of government remains unresolved in SCIC. It is the reason for causing above 
mentioned potential conflict of priority and unclear corporate governance in which there is other 
ministries and provincial authorities, beside Prime Minister and Ministry of Finance, taking part 
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in managing SCIC (VCCI, 2007). Thus, in the long run, this study recommends the Vietnamese 
government should move to the centralized model.   
China’s experience 
Before 2003, Chinese SOEs were under the control of many ministries and governmental 
agencies. The State Council of China approved the founding of the State Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) in May 2003. “SASAC is the organization authorized by 
the State Council to perform the responsibilities as the investor of the state-owned asset on 
behalf of the central government” and it separates “the government social and public 
management functions from the role as the investor of the state-owned assets in terms of 
institutional framework” (SASAC, 2003). Thus, after 2003, SASAC has been responsible for 
restructuring, reorganization, assessment and personnel in SOEs while other departments of 
government have been responsible for macro-control, administration, industrial policy and state 
auditing (Xiaoliang, 2006). The aspect in which SASAC performs the responsibility of investor 
of SOEs includes management of responsible persons, management of major matters, and 
management of state-owned assets (Xiaoliang, 2006). The Chinese SASAC is not only 
responsible for SOEs but also state business groups “which were seen as those with the highest 
potential to benefit from economies of scale and become global players over a short period of 
time” (World Bank, 2009). In practice, China already “experienced a period of experimenting 
with various organizations that were already established…; and finally, came to the creation of 
SASAC to assume the role of state owner in managing and supervising business groups and 
large-scale corporations to which previously experimented organizations proved inappropriate” 
(CIEM, 2009).  
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c) Improving governance structure and transparency of ownership structure  
Vietnamese SEGs’ ownership structure is pyramid. It is well documented that the pyramid 
structure can cause the disparity between control right and cash flow right, bringing about 
expropriation of minority shareholders, agency problems, incentives to build corporate empire, 
concentration of economic power, and lower firm value.   
 To limit such negative effects, the government should consider the regulation of holding 
company structure in Korea which aimed to improve corporate ownership and governance 
structure of large business conglomerates. Some main regulations include:  
(i) the 100% upper limit on debt-to-equity ratio, (ii) the 50% minimum share ownership 
requirement in subsidiaries (30% in case of public subsidiaries), (iii) the ban to have 
grandson companies in unrelated businesses, (iv) the ban to own shares in financial 
institutions (in case of non-financial holding companies), and (v) the ban on subsidiaries 
holding shares in other subsidiaries (OECD, 2002; KFTC, 2003; Nam, Kim, and Cuong, 
2010) 
Moreover, the Korean government also provided benchmarks for exemplary companies in 
governance system, granted incentives to business groups with low control-ownership disparity 
(Koh, 2009), and had policies to encourage companies to have advanced (transparent) holding 
company structure (KFTC, 2003). 
 Besides, the government should strengthen the transparency of ownership structure by 
requiring SEGs to disclose their ownership structure to the public. In Korea, “share ownership 
relationships between affiliates, and those between controlling families and affiliates will be 
publicized every year... The gap between ownership and control of each company and business 
conglomerate will be measured and disclosed each year as well” (KFTC, 2003). The Korean 
government also bolstered the disclosure obligations of both unlisted and unregistered companies. 
Stock transaction histories between specially related persons and affiliates, and loans from 
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financial affiliates are to be disclosed as well (KFTC, 2003). Additionally, the Korean 
government opened a website to publicly disclose each Cheabols’ intra-group ownership 
structure from 2007 (Nam, Kim, Cuong, 2010). 
Currently in Vietnam, “there is no external review mechanism for related-party 
transactions approved by the Board” while “the board is mainly composed of executives” so that 
“board approval of related-party transactions is not likely to be an effective control device” (Nam, 
Kim, Cuong, 2010).  “Also, the law does not give shareholders the right to challenge the board or 
to require a court to declare an unfair related-party transaction to be invalid. Moreover, the law 
does not impose responsibilities on the board and its members for unfair related-party 
transactions” (Nam, Kim, Cuong, 2010).  Therefore, the Vietnamese government should improve 
the current laws to address those shortcomings. Additionally, other considerations might be the 
formation of an inspection committee, “exclusively composed of non-executive independent 
members” to approve related-party transaction (Nam, Kim, Cuong, 2010). SEGs now have 
Control Board (CB) responsible for supervising CEO and assistant apparatus. SEGs can consider 
forming a CB consisting of all non-executive independent members, and authorize this CB to 
approve related-party transactions. Another way can be introducing at least 50% independent 
directors in the Board. Korean experience shows that the role of 50% outside director ratio was 
helpful in reducing related-party transactions (Black, Kim, Jang, and Park, 2008). 
4.3.2. Suggestions to empower BODs and CEO of groups’ mother companies 
Empowering Boards is one of the key challenges in corporate governance of SOEs. According to 
OECD (3) (2005), “the boards of SOEs should have the necessary authority, competencies and 
objectivity to carry out their function of strategic guidance and monitoring of management. They 
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should act with integrity and be held accountable for their actions”. In order to empower BODs, 
the owner should professionalize the Board, avoid encroaching Board’s role, construct a board 
with a reasonable size and good composition, and improve board’s evaluation and responsibility 
(OECD (3), 2005; Nam, 2009). 
 To professionalize the Board, the state should minimize political influence in the board 
member nomination process (Nam, 2009). In Vietnam, there is an inadequacy in both quality and 
quantity of board members but this thesis did not found out influence of politics on nominating 
BODs. Therefore, the government should improve the nomination process letting SCIC (if SEGs 
under SCIC) be responsible for getting better candidates. Added to this, the study suggests that 
the government should incorporate independent specialist’s consultancy in the process of 
nomination and compensation of BODs. The government also should not let state representatives 
join BODs as in the case for Petro Vietnam. Added to this, the government should not encroach 
on the BODs’ role and should give the BODs necessary authority to carry out its function. 
Besides, the boards “should be composed so that they can exercise objective and 
independent judgement” (OECD (3), 2005). Thus, the government (SCIC) should recruit a 
sufficient number of competent independent (non-executive) directors (from private sector) to 
empower the independent judgment of BODs. The government also should clarify rules to 
discard disqualified board members as well. According to Nam, Kim and Cuong (2010), the 
number of independent directors represented in BODs should be at least 50% and candidates for 
independent director positions should not have any tie with management or SCIC that can 
jeopardize their independence. Moreover, the chair of BODs and CEO (whose positions are 
combined in the case of Vinashin) should be separated to empower board’s independence from 
management (OECD, 2005; Nam, 2009).  
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Appointment or dismissal of CEOs by BODs should be made in consultation with the 
ownership entity (Nam, 2009). In more detail, CEO candidates should be nominated by the 
Board and appointed by the government (SCIC) (Nam, Kim, Cuong, 2010).  Even though no 
political influence has been found on nominating CEOs, there is a qualitative inadequacy of 
CEOs. Thus, the government also should incorporate independent specialist’s consultancy in the 
process of nominating CEOs to get better candidates. Once being appointed, the CEOs should 
enter a performance contract with SEGs that clarifies performance targets, performance 
evaluation criteria and methods, detailed compensation structure, and conditions to be rewarded 
or dismissed. Then, this contract also should be disclosed to the public.  
However, sometimes practices of SOEs in the world show that performance contracts 
were not effective because SOE managers have more information advantage to negotiate soft 
targets; governments usually prefer contracts with inadequate incentives and shorter duration; 
government still constrain managerial autonomy; and the contract is not credible without a third 
party (Nam, 2009). Correspondingly, Vietnam should avoid those empirically reported problems. 
The performance contract between the government and CEO should have the attendance of the 
third party. The government should also invite independent specialists to measure required 
objectives and evaluate CEO’s performance. In addition, both the government and CEO should 
follow strictly the contract as long as it is signed.  
Regarding compensation of CEO, the government (SCIC) should develop clear 
performance indicators for assessing managerial performance of CEO and evaluation score 
should be linked to specific reward, bonus, and punishment. Also, performance evaluation report 
should be disclosed to the public. That was Korean experience with Government Invested 
74 
 
Enterprise (GIE) Management Evaluation Council regulated in GIE Administration Basic Act of 
1983 (Nam, 2009).  
Currently, the tenure of Board members, Control Board members and CEO is 5 years and 
can be renewed. The Vietnamese government should shorten their term to at most 3 years.  
“Shortening the tenure alleviates the problem of staggered board and enhances the effectiveness 
of cumulative voting which is mandated under the Enterprise Law of 2005” (Nam, Kim and 
Cuong, 2010).  
4.3.3. Suggestions for subsidiaries and the mother-subsidiary relation of SEGs 
In order to get success in forming leading economic groups for the whole economy, enhancing 
internal governance also plays an important role. Based on the current internal governance 
problems of SEGs the study suggests the following solutions.  
a) Strengthening directors and managers in subsidiaries 
Capable directors and managers of subsidiaries are also insufficient in both quality and quantity. 
Suggestions for this part are similar to above suggestions for BODs and CEO in mother 
companies. Mother companies should ensure a better and adequate nomination of directors and 
managers in their subsidiaries. Mother companies also should get independent specialist’s 
consultancy in the process of nomination, compensation and evaluation of directors and 
managers in their subsidiaries. Performance contracts, independent directors in subsidiaries, 
performance linked to reward and punishment also should be applied for subsidiaries. SEGs also 
should pay attention on professionalizing directors and managers in subsidiaries by offering them 
instructing courses and other studying opportunities. 
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b) Improving organizational mechanism of the groups 
The mother company should refrain from intervening in the management of its subsidiaries. 
Instead, the managerial guide and monitor of the mother company have to be based on the 
ownership relation. Subsidiaries should have their own autonomy in operation and making 
decisions and at the same time, they have to take their own responsibility on their activities. The 
mother company can manage the operation of subsidiaries by exercising its shareholder rights.  
Besides, SEGs should put in place clear rules for efficient allocation of management 
functions between the mother company and subsidiaries. For example, the mother company can 
be responsible for group’s strategic direction, coordination and resource allocation among 
subsidiaries, while subsidiaries are responsible for business operation subject to the direction of 
the mother company. The mother company and subsidiaries also should negotiate and co-
construct consistent regulations on function, responsibility, relation among companies within the 
group. Those internal regulations can provide the basis for whole group to operate more 
efficiently. 
Moreover, if it is necessary, the mother company might form a specialized division 
concentrating on regularly supervising subsidiaries’ operations to make quick necessary 
adjustments. Korean Chaebols typically have excellent head-quarters with specialized 
supervising divisions which can quickly identify needed changes and make timely adjustment on 
subsidiaries (Hwang, 2009).  
Also importantly, as mentioned in the part 4.3.1.c) of this thesis, in order to minimize 
potential problem related to unlawful related party transaction which can be easily resulted from 
pyramid structure of groups, the mother company should have a subcommittee that assumes the 
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mandate of approving or disproving transactions with other member firms within the group. This 
subcommittee is recommended to be exclusively composed of non-executive independent 
members (Nam, Kim, and Cuong, 2010).   
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Conclusion 
Vietnam established SEGs with the aim for them to become leaders of the whole economy which 
can compete in the global market. SEGs have been created as a result of SOE reform, as they 
have been established on the basis of the restructuring of state general corporations. As of 
January 2010, Vietnam has twelve pilot SEGs. Most of them have the mother companies fully 
state owned and one has the joint stock mother company which is majority-owned by the 
government.  
Although SEGs have been newly established, they have already made massive 
diversification into unrelated fields, especially finance, banking, securities, and insurance. This 
extensive diversification accompanied by many problems has become the controversial concern 
of many observers and raises doubt on SEGs’ corporate governance. This study aims to 
investigate outstanding issues in both SEGs’ diversification and corporate governance to suggest 
relevant recommendations.  
SEGs’ current diversification and performance expose such problems as the neglect of 
their main business, scattering resources and competitiveness, taking high risk and low efficiency, 
having the potential conflict of interest between groups and banks, and weak management in 
new unrelated business fields.  
In their corporate governance, SEGs demonstrate both external and internal weaknesses. 
The first weakness relates to the government’s supervision which shows a conflict of objectives, 
a complex chain of agents, and a vacuum of legal regulations and policies. The second one 
involves various weaknesses for BODs and CEO of mother companies such as insufficient 
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management ability, bureaucrat participation in BODs, no attempt to introduce independent 
directors, and shortcomings in compensation of managers. The third one is the shortcomings of 
groups’ subsidiaries and mother-subsidiary relation which relate to directors and managers of 
subsidiaries and the internal organizational mechanism. 
Based on the identified shortcomings and the investigation of the causes for problems as 
well as common guidelines of corporate governance, this thesis suggests solutions to ensure 
efficiency and good corporate governance for SEGs while considering experiences of Korea and 
China. 
Diversification can be a promising model to form strong state groups in such less 
developed countries as Vietnam, but the groups and the government have to ensure an efficiently 
structured and regulated group model which goes along with good corporate governance. 
However, SEGs should put the highest priority on improving their core strength; then, if they can 
afford to diversify, they should prefer to invest in related areas before thinking of unrelated ones; 
and, SEGs’ investment in banks/credit-taking institutions and some extreme risky areas (venture 
capital…) should be restricted.  
In the area of government supervision on SEGs, the thesis suggests improving the 
transparency of SEGs’ objective and performance; ultimately adopting the centralized model of 
state ownership function while, in the short run, organizing SEGs under SCIC; and, improving 
governance structure and transparency of ownership structure of SEGs.  
Suggestions to empower BODs and CEO of groups’ mother companies include 
professionalizing the Board, introducing independent directors, improving the process of 
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appointment, dismissal and evaluation of board members and CEO, using performance contract, 
and developing appropriate compensation schemes for CEO. 
As for subsidiaries and the mother-subsidiary relation of SEGs, the groups should 
strengthen the roles of directors and managers of subsidiaries and improve internal organization 
mechanism of the groups. 
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Appendix 1: List of some unrelated subsidiaries of Vietnamese SEGs (2010) 
 
Group Unrelated subsidiaries Subsidiaries’ shares owned by groups 
Establishe
d/ invested 
date 
Business areas of 
subsidiaries 
Petro VN 
Petro VN finance joint stock Corp. (PVFC) 
www.pvfc.com.vn 
78% owned by  
PetroVN 2008 
Finance and  
banking 
Petro VN Financial Investment and 
Consultancy Co. (PVFC Invest) 
www.pvfcinvest.vn 
35.5% owned by  PVFC 2007 
Financial 
investment and 
consultancy 
PVFC Real Estate JSC (PVFC Land) 
http://www.pvfc.com.vn  2007 Real estate trading 
PVFC Fund Management JSC (PVFC 
Capital) 
http://www.pvfccapital.com.vn 
24% by PetroVN, 27% 
by PVFC  2007 Fund management 
Phu Dat Investment and Construction JSC 
http://phudatjsc.com.vn 
93.4% owned by PVFC, 
6.5% by PVFC Land, 
0.1% by PVFC Invest 
2008 Real estate  
PetroVN Finance Communication JSC. 
(PVFC Media) 
http://www.pvfc.com.vn 
PVFC is 1 of 5 founders 2007 Media 
PetroVN Insurance Corp. (PVI)  
www.pvi.com.vn  2007 Insurance 
PetroVN Drilling Investment Corp. (PVD 
Invest) www.pvdi.com.vn 
51% owned by 
PetroVN Drilling Co. 2007 
Financial 
investment and 
consultancy 
PetroVN trade union finance investment 
Corp. (PVFI) 
www.pvfi.com.vn 
75% owned by PVN 
and its employees, 10% 
owned by PSI 
2008 
Financial 
investment and 
consultancy 
Petro VN Securities JSC (PVFC Securities) 
www.psi.com.vn 
More than 50% owned 
by PVFC 2006 Securities 
Ocean bank 
http://oceanbank.vn 20% by Petro VN 2009 Banking 
An Binh Joint Stock Bank (ABBank) 
http://www.abbank.vn 27% owned by PVFC 2005 Banking 
Global Petro JS Bank (GP Bank) 
http://www.gpbank.com.vn  
20% owned by 
PetroVN 2005 Banking 
PetroVN Power Land JSC (PV Power Land) 
www.pvpowerland.vn 
28%  owned by PV 
power, 10% by PVFC 2007 Real estate 
EVN 
Ha Thanh Security JSC (HASC)  
www.hasc.com.vn/  2006 Securities 
An Binh securities JSC (ABS) 
http://www.abs.vn 
Majority of shares 
owned by EVN and 
ABB 
2006 Securities 
Power Real Estate JSCs. (EVN Land ) 
includes:  
EVN Land Saigonhttp://www.evnlandsaigon.vn
EVN Land Central 
http://www.evnlandcentral.com.vn/ 
Majority of shares 
owned by EVN 2007 Real estate 
An Binh Joint Stock Bank (ABBank) 
http://www.abbank.vn 25.37% owned by EVN 2005 Banking 
EVN Finance JSC (EVN Finance) 
http://www.evnfc.vn/ 
40% by EVN 
8,4% by ABBank  2008 
Finance and 
banking 
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Vinashin 
 
VN shipbuilding finance Co. (VFC) 
www.vinashin-finance.com.vn 
100% owned by 
Vinashin 1998 
Finance and 
banking 
Vinashin Finance Leasing Co. Ltd. (VFL) 100% owned by Vinashin 2008 
Finance and finance 
leasing 
CIMB-Vinashin Ltd. Co (CIMB-Vinashin 
securities) 
Owned by VFC and 
CIMB 2008 Securities 
Vinashin-finance securities Co. 
www.vinashin-finance.com.vn 100% owned by VFC 2008 Securities 
Vinashin Thanh Dat real estate JSC- 
Vinashin Land   Real estate 
VRG 
Rubber finance Co. (RFC) 
http://rfc.com.vn 100% owned by VRG 1998 
Finance and 
banking 
Ruber Securities joint stock Co. (RUSE) 
www.rubse.com.vn 
40% owned by VRG 
and 11% owned by 
RFC 
2006 Securities 
Saigon Hanoi Bank (SHB) 
http://www.shb.com.vn 
15% owned by VRG 2006 Banking 
Saigon-Hanoi Fund management JSC (SHF) 
www.shf.com.vn 
Majority of shares 
owned by VRG, SHB, 
and Vinacomin 
2008 Investment Fund 
Viettel 
Vinaconex-Viettel finance JSC (VVF) 32% onwed by Vietel 2008 Finance and banking 
Military joint Stock Bank (MB) 
http://www.militarybank.com.vn/ 15% owned by Viettel 2008 Banking 
Vinacomin 
Mineral & Coal finance Co. Ltd. 
www.cmf.vn 
100% owned by 
Vinacomin 2007 
Finance and 
banking 
SHB-Vinacomin Insurance Joint- Stock 
Company 
www.svic.vn 
19.8% owned by 
Vinacomin 2008 Insurance 
Saigon Hanoi Joint Stock Bank (SHB) 
http://www.shb.com.vn 
15% owned by 
Vinacomin 2006 Banking 
Saigon-Hanoi Fund management JSC (SHF) 
www.shf.com.vn 
Majority of shares 
owned by Vinacomin, 
SHB, and VRG 
2008 Investment Fund 
VNPT 
Post & telecommunication finance Co. (PTF)
www.ptfinance.com.vn 
100% owned by the 
state 1998 
Finance and 
banking 
Vietnam Postal Savings Services Company 
(VPSC) 
www.vpsc.com.vn 
100% owned by VNPT 
Holdings 1999 Banking 
Posts &Tel. Joint - Stock Insurance 
Company (PTI) 
www.pti.com.vn 
 1998 Insurance 
Vietnam Maritime JS Bank (Maritime Bank)
www.msb.com.vn/  21.33% by VNPT 2005 Banking 
Vinatext 
Textile Finace Co. (TFC) 
www.vinatex.com.vn 
100% owned by 
Vinatext  
Finance and 
banking 
Vinatext Land 
www.vinatexland.net/  2007 Real estate 
Empower Securities JSC (EPS) 
http://www.eps.com.vn 22% owned by Vinatext 2007 Securieties 
Vinachem 
VN chemical Finance JSC (VCFC) 
www.vcfc.com.vn 
37% owned by 
Vinachem, 10% by Bao 
Minh 
2008 Finance and banking 
Vietstar joint stock bank 5% owned by Vinachem 2008 Banking 
82 
 
Bao Minh Insurance JSC (Bao Minh) 
http://www.baominh.com.vn  2004 Insurance 
Songda 
Songda Finance JSC. (SDFC) 
www.sdfc.com.vn
Majority owned by 
Songda Holdings 2008 
Finance and 
banking
PVFC Fund Management Joint stock 
Company (PVFC Capital) 
http://www.pvfccapital.com.vn 
20 % by SUDICO – 
subsidiary of Songda 2007 Fund management 
Petro VN Power Land JSC (PVPower Land) 
http://www.pvpowerland.vn/ 10% owned by Songda 2007 Real estate 
Source: websites of SEGs, above mentioned companies, http://www.nganhangtaichinh.com/, and 
http://www.company.vn/ 
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